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The Devil in the Details: The Interrelationship Among
Citizenship, Rule of Law and Form-Adhesive
Contracts
ZEV J. EIGEN
Research on standard form contracts tends to focus on five areas: (1) analyzing the
contents of common form contracts; (2) determining why competition mostly does not exist
among firms drafting these contracts; (3) modeling consumer responses to boilerplate; (4)
exploring judicial interpretation of these forms; and (5) discussing normatively how courts
and laws should handle these contracts. This Study explores empirically how individuals
experience and interpret form-adhesive agreements, in the hope of further understanding
how they affect exchange relationships between organizations and individuals. This Article
uses a measure of perceived enforceability to analyze actors’ interpretations of these
ubiquitous agreements and explore the elusive yet historically important concepts of
citizenship and trust in the rule of law. To do this, this Article develops a construct, called
“malleable consent,” as a measure of actors’ perceptions of unenforceability of form
agreements to which they have consented without duress, fraud or coercion.
Based on interviews with sales associates of a large national retailer and survey
responses of MBA students of an elite university, this Article offers preliminary evidence
that actors who regard form-adhesive agreements as binding upon them are more likely to
regard their employment relationships as “relational” (imbued with trust, loyalty and a set
of ethical commitments). Conversely, actors who regard such agreements as non-binding
are more likely to view their employment relationships as “transactional” (merely a market
exchange). Further, the construct, malleable consent, is used to reveal differences in
actors’ use of law as a form of coercive power across socio-economic groups. Preliminary
evidence suggests that less educated, lower skilled and lower paid subjects with greater
employment dependency are more likely to feel bound by the terms of form-adhesive
agreements that restrict their resort to law than more educated, higher skilled, and higher
paid subjects with less employment dependency.
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The Devil in the Details: The Interrelationship Among
Citizenship, Rule of Law and Form-Adhesive
Contracts
ZEV J. EIGEN∗
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine this argument made to a judge:
Your Honor, it is true that my client signed the contract
at issue in this case. It is true that there was no fraud in the
inducement, procedural unconscionability or coercion. We
further concede that the contract contains terms to which both
parties consented without duress, and that no terms are
substantively unconscionable. Nonetheless, we submit that
the terms contained in the contract should be viewed by this
court as mere invitations to negotiate, as suggestions on how
the parties should behave, and not as binding terms, in spite
of their wording to the contrary.
Would this lawyer be laughed out of court? Is it not oxymoronic to
describe a “contract’s” terms as suggestive invitations to negotiate? What
if instead of being made to a judge, this argument was made by one
contracting party to the other? Under what circumstances would this
argument actually prevail, in spite of its clear defiance of classical,
objective theory of contract and intuitive unfairness? Lastly, if this way of
viewing contracts were the norm and not the exception, what effects would
this have, if any, on economic and social exchange, considering that by
many accounts, our systems for both economic and social exchange are
founded on and continue to depend on the fundamental principles of
objective theory of contract, including consideration and meeting of the
minds?
These questions may seem chimerical or absurd if one imagines a
classical contractual setting like those commonly taught in first-year law
school classes, in which parties haggle over terms and then memorialize
∗
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them in a document called “contract.” However, the argument presented
above may seem less abusrd if one imagines instead, the most common
type of contract governing exchanges between organizations and
individuals today. These are, of course, form-adhesive contracts. Formadhesive contracts are ubiquitous. Anyone who has received a loan,
entered into a mortgage agreement, rented a car, purchased software,
music, or other media, received medical care, entered into a cell phone
service contract, gone on a cruise, signed up for a credit card, joined a club,
or engaged in just about any other economic exchange with an
organization in the last three decades has likely encountered many such
agreements. In fact, relationships between organizations and individuals
are rooted in these take-it-or-leave-it contracts drafted by organizations (or
more often, lawyers representing the organizations’ interests), intended to
be signed by numerous individuals such as customers, employees, medicalcare recipients and others. And yet, in spite of their ubiquity, formadhesive contracts are relatively understudied. When they are studied, it is
rarely from a socio-legal perspective, although the need to adopt such an
approach has been acknowledged.1 Most of the attention paid to form
contracts has been from an economic or legal-economic perspective,
focused on theory and model building as opposed to empirical inquiry.
Most existing scholarship has adopted the perspective of “society,” the
legal system, the economy, or the drafters of form agreements. A focus on
individuals’ experiences with and interpretations of these contracts is much
less common.2 Individual behavior with respect to such terms is usually
assumed, theorized, or modeled. It is rarely empirically observed and
reported.
Assumptions made about how individuals experience and interpret
form agreements may not be accurate, and may lead to incomplete or
inaccurate conclusions about the effects of such agreements. As form
agreements often dominate and define the contractual landscape in such
important areas as mortgage lending, consumer relations, intellectual
property licensing, and dispute resolution (in employment and consumer
domains), it would seem like a worthwhile endeavor to empirically explore
the effects of such contracts both within and across socio-economic strata,
if for no other reason than to contribute to policy discussions in these areas.
Further, as explained in more detail below, prior socio-legal research
suggests that form-adhesive contracts may be a fruitful but relatively
1
Todd D. Rakoff, Commentary, The Law and Sociology of Boilerplate, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1235,
1244–46 (2006) (discussing advantages of a judicial, rather than an administrative or legislative,
approach to resolving issues with boilerplate contracts).
2
One exception is Dennis P. Stolle & Andrew J. Slain, Standard Form Contracts and Contract
Schemas: A Preliminary Investigation of the Effects of Exculpatory Clauses on Consumers’ Propensity
to Sue, 15 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 83, 83 (1997) (presenting initial evidence that “exculpatory clauses [in
form contracts], if read, have a deterrent effect on propensity to seek compensation”) (emphasis added).
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untapped area in which to explore views about citizenship in the state.
This Article seeks to fill these voids in the literature by employing
several empirical methodologies (structured face-to-face interviews and
surveys) to study individual social actors’ experiences with and
interpretations of form-adhesive agreements. In so doing, this Article
seeks to contribute to the discussion of citizenship and the role of the rule
of law in daily life.
Existing research about form contracts has been framed by the
observation that these agreements are axiomatically different from
contracts as classically defined. Specifically, drafting organizations
promulgating these contracts are invariably more powerful than, and less
dependent on, the individuals who sign them.3 There is often no “meeting
of the minds” in the classical sense of the term, as many signers do not
read or understand what is in the agreements they sign. In fact, some
organizations take great pains to craft and deliver their forms specifically
to minimize the likelihood of such a “meeting of the minds.”4
Scholarship has explored the nature of these differences and the
important question of how such differences affect judicial enforcement of
these contracts. For instance, economists have questioned the lack of
competition over terms contained in such contracts.5 Others have pondered
whether these agreements are one-sided, the extent of the one-sidedness,
and the conditions under which they are more or less one-sided.6 Still
3
The term “powerful” is used here in the classical, social exchange theoretical sense, essentially
as a function of imbalanced mutual dependence. See, e.g., JAMES COLEMAN, FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL
THEORY 134–35 (1994) (diagramming the value of an individual’s power and situations where that
power will be greatest); LINDA D. MOLM, COERCIVE POWER IN SOCIAL EXCHANGE 11–39 (1997)
(describing basic concepts, assumptions, and principles of social exchange theory and its conception of
power); Richard M. Emerson, Power-Dependence Relations, 27 AM. SOC. REV. 31, 31–36 (1962) (“In
short, power resides implicitly in the other’s dependency.”); George C. Homans, Social Behavior as
Exchange, 63 AM. J. SOC. 597, 605–06 (1958) (discussing small-group research on social structure and
exchanges of influence).
4
BOB SULLIVAN, GOTCHA CAPITALISM 8–10 (2007) (describing how, in 2001, AT&T
intentionally drafted a contractual provision in which customers agreed to waive their right to sue the
company and tailored distribution of this provision so as to minimize likelihood that it would be
noticed or read).
5
See, e.g., Xavaer Gabaix & David Laibson, Shrouded Attributes, Consumer Myopia, and
Information Suppression in Competitive Markets, 121 Q. J. ECON. 505 (2006) (discussing existence of
information “shrouding” even in competitive markets); Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality,
Standard Form Contracts and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203 (2003) (arguing that
because contract terms may not enter into buyers’ decision-making processes, drafting parties may
have incentive to include inefficient contract terms in standard forms).
6
See, e.g., Robert A. Hillman, Online Boilerplate: Would Mandatory Web Site Disclosure of eStandard Terms Backfire?, in BOILERPLATE: THE FOUNDATION OF MARKET CONTRACTS 83, 85 (Omri
Ben-Shahar ed., 2007) (arguing that online disclosure might shield vendors from unconscionability
claims, rather than increase actual readership of contract terms); Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of
Adhesion—Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629 (1943) (noting reasons
behind unequal bargaining positions); Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in
Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1173 (1983) (arguing that form terms contained in adhesion
contracts should be presumptively unenforceable); W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and
Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529 (1971) (proposing an analytical
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others have contemplated when such terms are enforced by courts and
when they ought not to be.7 Some note that boilerplate is not as bad as it
may seem, in part because firms selectively enforce them against signers.8
As discussed below, this last observation is perhaps the most interesting
example of the underlying conundrum presented by form-adhesive
agreements. For the most part, however, those who have approached the
subject try to ascertain what the text of these agreements purports to do,
when they are good or bad (where “bad” means the language is one-sided
in favor of the drafting organization), just how bad they are, how courts
have treated such terms, and how courts should treat such terms.
These approaches are useful and serve an important role in addressing
policy discussions about form-adhesive agreements. However, they
collectively fall short of the mark when trying to understand the role of
such contracts in exchange relationships, or more significantly in
sustaining or undermining the rule of law. Also, it would seem that more
than three decades of socio-legal studies have repeatedly demonstrated the
need to understand not only the formal “law on the books” aspect of a legal
phenomenon such as form contracts, but the “law in action” aspect as well.
The “law in action” approach is particularly salient in this area because, as
noted in the literature and confirmed by the research reported herein, form
agreements are often not even read or understood by the signers. It would
therefore make sense to explore interpretations of and experiences with
form agreements (the “law in action” component) to determine how the
law should regard these contracts, and at the very least to supplement the
existing research, which has addressed the “law on the books” component
almost exclusively.
framework in light of courts’ failure to address unfairness of one-sided consumer contracts).
7
See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird, The Boilerplate Puzzle, 104 MICH. L. REV. 933 (2006) (arguing that
standardized contract terms should not automatically be suspect); Michelle E. Boardman, Contra
Proferentem: The Allure of Ambiguous Boilerplate, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1105, 1105–06 (2006)
(“Drafters value boilerplate because the courts know what it means.”); Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J.
Rachlinksi, Standard-Form Contracting in the Electronic Age, 77 NYU L. REV. 429 (2002)
(concluding that current framework used by courts for dealing with form contracts will be sufficient to
apply to the Internet world); Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, What’s in a Standard Form Contract? An
Empirical Analysis of Software License Agreements, 4 J. EMP. LEG. STUD. 677 (2007) (finding that
licenses tend to be biased in favor of software companies, and that the larger or younger a company, the
more one-sided the contract); Slawson, supra note 6, at 532 (“It would be equally unrealistic to confer
on courts broad powers to rewrite [form-adhesive agreements].”).
8
See, e.g., Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, “Unfair” Dispute Resolution Clauses: Much Ado About
Nothing?, in BOILERPLATE THE FOUNDATION OF MARKET CONTRACTS 45, 46–66 (Omri Ben-Shahar
ed., 2007) (applying an empirical study of dispute resolution clauses to find that such clauses do not
place hardships upon consumers); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Richard A. Posner, One-Sided Contracts in
Competitive Consumer Markets, 104 MICH. L. REV. 827, 828 (2006) (noting that a company’s
“expectation of doing business with other consumers in the future may dissuade it from enforcing a
one-sided contract to the hilt”); Jason Scott Johnston, The Return of Bargain: An Economic Theory of
How Standard-Form Contracts Enable Cooperative Negotiation Between Businesses and Consumers,
104 MICH. L. REV. 857, 858 (2006) (“[F]irms . . . have given their managerial employees the discretion
to grant exceptions from the standard-form terms on a case-by-case basis.”).
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It may occur to those steeped in the law and society tradition—
particularly those of the legal realist persuasion and even more particularly
those familiar with the seminal work of Stewart Macaulay,9 Grant
Gilmore10 and Lawrence M. Friedman11—that such a focus on the citizen is
essential to fully understand these unusual forms of contract as
experienced. Contract as experienced, as Macaulay and others would
likely agree, is often more important than contract as written. In fact, the
necessity of including empirical analysis of individuals’ experiences and
interpretations of contracts is evidenced by the central finding of
Macaulay’s important work on contracts among businessmen: individual
opinions about contracts more saliently predict how breaches are perceived
and resolved than the contract terms themselves.12 This research seeks to
extend the work of Macaulay and others by examining how individuals
actually experience form agreements, and how individual interpretations of
form agreements affect the way in which social actors exchange
(contractually or otherwise) with the organizations that require their
consent on such forms.
The objectives for this analysis are threefold. First, this Article argues
that through an exploration of individual interpretations of and experiences
with form-adhesive agreements, it is possible to gain a fuller understanding
of trust in the rule of law and by extension, citizenship in the state.
Second, this Article seeks to contribute to the important discussion among
contract scholars about how form agreements ought to be regarded in
doctrine and legislation by demonstrating empirically the connection
between interpretations of form-adhesive agreements and how individuals
regard their ongoing relationships with form-drafting organizations. Third,
in challenging the assumption of uniformity in individual interpretation of
form agreements, this Article argues that observed differences of
interpretations of and experiences with boilerplate vary with socioeconomic status (SES), such that higher SES actors view the enforceability
of contracts they have signed as more malleable than lower SES actors.
The implications of such SES-based differences of interpretation of form
agreements for theories of democracy and the liberal state may be far9
See generally Stewart Macaulay, An Empirical View of Contract, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 465 (1985)
(reflecting on his 1963 article and updating his theory); Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations
in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55 (1963) [hereinafter Macaulay, NonContractual Relations] (noting that, in the business world, planning of exchange relations and use of
legal sanctions to settle disputes are seen as unnecessary and undesirable).
10
See, e.g., GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 87 (1974) (“[W]e might say that what is
happening is that ‘contract’ is being reabsorbed into the mainstream of ‘tort.’”).
11
See generally LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CONTRACT LAW IN AMERICA: A SOCIAL AND
ECONOMIC CASE STUDY (1965) (studying relations between and changes in contract law and society in
Wisconsin from the Civil War through the 1950s).
12
Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations, supra note 9, at 55 (directly and succinctly introducing
the article by asking, “What good is contract law? Who uses it? When and how?”).
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reaching considering the degree to which citizens’ consumer and
employment relations are governed by these contracts.
In sum, this Article attempts to elaborate on our understanding of
citizenship through perceptions of contract. This is not at odds with prior
research on boilerplate. In fact, it is an extension of existing research in
mostly uncharted directions. However, in so doing, this Article challenges
several critical assumptions made by existing scholarship about the
uniformity of perceived enforceability of form agreements.
To illustrate the importance of actor-centered empirical inquiry,
consider the arguments advanced by Lucian Bebchuk and Richard Posner
in one article13 and Jason Scott Johnston in another.14 These authors claim
that firms do not intend to strictly enforce the terms contained in form
agreements.15 That is, firms keep self-serving terms in form contracts to
selectively “fend off consumer opportunism,” as Omri Ben-Shahar
describes it, but otherwise allow honest clients off the hook.16 These
authors assume a uniformity of individual interpretation of the form
agreements they have signed. All actors, they argue, are assumed to
behave consistently with their interests—when the terms are activated and
not in their interests, individuals will speak up and demand
circumnavigation from the organizations, otherwise honest clients remain
silent. Firms then sort the honest from the dishonest and enforce only
against the latter, resulting in a presumptively fair outcome. Johnston goes
so far as to argue that boilerplate encourages negotiation, like the lawyer’s
hypothetical argument at the outset of this Article, suggesting that the
terms contained in such agreements to which both sides have ostensibly
bound themselves are merely invitations to negotiate.17 This may be the
organizations’ view, and this Article later addresses how this approach
parallels the way in which powerful, ruling-class elite social actors
historically transformed statutory law to conform to their interests. But
this assumption conflates the notion of self-interest, on the one hand, with
perceptions of one’s ability to rely on the law to enforce a contract or to
wield the law as a sword to escape from a contractual provision that
appears unlawful on the other. This Article argues that these things are
quite separate, and need to be measured separately, especially when the
exchange relationship of interest is axiomatically power-imbalanced as is
13

Bebchuk & Posner, supra note 8.
Johnston, supra note 8.
Bebchuk & Posner, supra note 8, at 827–28; Johnston, supra note 8, at 858.
16
BOILERPLATE: THE FOUNDATION OF MARKET CONTRACTS, at xi (Omri Ben-Shahar ed., 2007).
17
See Johnston, supra note 8, at 864–77 (citing examples of standard-form contracts in which
negotiating over terms with consumers is an accepted and expected business practice); Joel Rothstein
Wolfson, Contract and Copyright Are Not at War: A Reply to “The Metamorphosis of Contract into
Expand,” 87 CAL. L. REV. 79, 95 (1999) (“As corporate counsel for a large corporation, I can tell you
that very few terms in a contract are truly ‘non-negotiable.’”).
14
15
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the case with form-adhesive contracts.
What if all individual signers do not view these contracts they have
Form
signed in this unusual way—as invitations to negotiate?18
agreements are, after all, binding legal contracts (at least they may appear
as such to some). What if some regard form contracts “myopically,”
thinking that there is no post-agreement negotiation available, and others
regard them, perhaps more sophisticatedly, as open and quite negotiable,
like the “myopes” and “sophisticated consumers” in Xavaer Gabaix and
David Laibson’s terms?19 This is exactly the type of division that prior
research on law as a differentiated resource suggests. Along these lines,
what if the variation in individual interpretations is such that the
organizations’ opportunities for sorting are not aligned to distinguish
opportunism from altruism? What if SES differences among individuals
explain part of the variation, such that lower SES actors are more likely to
feel bound by one-sided terms than higher SES actors? Again, this is
consistent with prior scholarship on citizenship.
The purpose of this Article is to raise questions, provoke discussion
and begin to empirically vet the theories developed about perceived
enforceability of contract. It is also the aim of this Article to expand the
scope of inquiry on the phenomenon of form contracts beyond the present
range of disciplines. Hopefully, this Article illustrates the need for further
empirical study of citizens’ engagement with these ubiquitous contracts.
To begin, this Article examines these questions: What happens to
interpretations of enforceability when actors bind themselves to contracts
that they have had no opportunity to participate in negotiating or drafting?
Does variation exist in interpretations of enforceability of such
agreements? What effect(s), if any, does such variation have on the way
individuals interpret their exchanges with the entities (mostly institutions)
that draft such agreements? Do groups of socio-economic actors interpret
enforceability of agreements differently and with what effect, if any?
To address these questions, a construct called “malleable consent” is
introduced, which is the view that an agreement to which one has
consented without duress or fraud is nonetheless not enforceable against
the signer in whole or in relevant part. Part II traces the theory underlying
the interrelationship among interpretations of contract, trust in the rule of
law and citizenship in the state. This Part also outlines malleable consent’s
theoretical utility as an indicator of trust in the rule of law. Malleable
consent is presented as a means of studying how individuals construe and
18
Interestingly, there is research demonstrating gender differences in the way in which
individuals perceive opportunities to initiate negotiations. See generally LINDA BABCOCK & SARA
LASCHEVER, WOMEN DON'T ASK: NEGOTIATION AND THE GENDER DIVIDE (2003) (exploring gender
gap in propensity to initiate negotiations).
19
Gabaix & Laibson, supra note 5, at 507–09.
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respond to form agreements, and as a way of examining popular faith in
the rule of law.
Part III explains the two questions motivating the research
methodology and findings. First, how does malleable consent vary across
SES? Second, what is the relationship, if any, between malleable consent
and how individuals exchange with their employers: as a transaction
devoid of trust and loyalty, or as an ongoing relationship? Part IV details
the two studies in which malleable consent was observed.
The main analysis is in Part V, which sets out the preliminary findings
supporting the hypothesis that higher SES actors are more likely to regard
form-adhesive agreements as unenforceable when compared to lower SES
actors. Part VI then discusses the findings in support of the hypothesis that
actors are more likely to regard form agreements as unenforceable (high
malleable consent) when they view their jobs as instrumental
transactions—as simply a financial exchange. Where employment is
regarded as an exchange of obligations as well as rewards, as imbued with
a substantive, moral relationship—what industrial relations scholars often
refer to as a “social contract” or a “relational exchange”20—actors are more
likely to regard the form-adhesive agreements as enforceable (low
malleable consent).
Essentially, when actors view form-adhesive
agreements as unenforceable, there is less expressed trust in the
employment relationship. These results seem to hold across diverse
populations, from low level employees of a national company to MBA
students at an elite business school. MBA students, who enjoy less
dependent employment constraints (for example, more job opportunities
and less dependencies), voice less respect for the enforceability of the
contracts they sign. They display malleable consent more frequently than
sales associates with greater employment dependency and constraints.
Exploring these differences across the two divergent groups, the construct
is presented as a means of revealing otherwise unobserved differences
among citizens’ interpretations of law in the employment context. Part VI
discusses the implications of this research and Part VII the limitations.
The conclusion follows.

20
THOMAS KOCHAN & BETH SHULMAN, ECON. POLICY INST., A NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT:
RESTORING DIGNITY AND BALANCE TO THE ECONOMY 1 (2007); Thomas Kochan, Presidential Address
to the 52nd Annual Meeting of the Industrial Relations Research Association: Building a New Social
Contract at Work: A Call to Action, 3 (January 7–9, 2000), available at http://www.press.uillinois.edu/
journals/irra/IRRA_Proceedings_2000.pdf#page=12.
See generally PAUL OSTERMAN ET AL.,
WORKING IN AMERICA: A BLUEPRINT FOR THE NEW LABOR MARKET (2001) (discussing the difficulty
American industry faces in meeting social obligations to workers in a modern economy).
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II. THE INTERRELATIONSHIP AMONG CITIZENSHIP, CONTRACT AND TRUST
IN THE RULE OF LAW
There is a connection between interpretations of law and virtually all
social and economic exchange. By understanding such interpretations, we
may gain a fuller understanding of the circumstances under which
individuals rely on the law, avoid the law, break the law and believe in the
consequences of actions that deviate from the law.21 This connection is
important because, in part, it defines citizenship in the state. Work by
sociologists and other scholars has repeatedly and consistently
demonstrated this connection.22 Trust in agreements underlies not only
economic transactions but also lies at the heart of the civil justice system,
the rule of law more generally, and, to a larger extent, our ability to interact
socially. The notion that parties to an exchange may bind themselves
presently, and often rely on their agreements in the future, is
simultaneously at the root of all commerce and all social interaction.
Understanding this relationship is important because deterioration of the
critical mass of contract-enforceability believers yields a corresponding
21
See generally PATRICIA EWICK & SUSAN S. SILBEY, THE COMMON PLACE OF LAW: STORIES
FROM EVERYDAY LIFE (1998) (examining anecdotally ways in which Americans’ lives are influenced
by the way they think about and use the law); Patricia Ewick & Susan Silbey, Narrating Social
Structure: Stories of Resistance to Legal Authority, 6 AM. J. SOC. 1328, 1329 (2003) (arguing that
“resistance [to law] is enabled and collectivized . . . by the circulation of stories narrating moments
when taken for granted social structure is exposed and the usual direction of constraint upended”); Kent
Greenawalt, The Natural Duty to Obey the Law, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1, 2 (1985) (examining “natural
duty” to explain why people “have a moral obligation or duty to obey the law”); Susan S. Silbey &
Austin Sarat, Critical Traditions in Law and Society Research, 21 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 165, 165 (1987)
(“Legal institutions cannot be understood without seeing the entire social environment.”).
22
See, e.g., KRISTIN BUMILLER, THE CIVIL RIGHTS SOCIETY: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF
VICTIMS 1 (1988) (“challeng[ing] the conventional faith in the law’s ability to eradicate social
prejudice”); JAMES S. COLEMAN, FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL THEORY (1990) (concerning behavior of
social systems); EWICK & SILBEY, supra note 21, at xi (“us[ing] stories of everyday life to discover the
different ways in which people use and think about law”); IN LITIGATION: DO THE “HAVES” STILL
COME OUT AHEAD? (Herbert M. Kritzer & Susan S. Silbey eds., 2003) (discussing how social changes
have affected Marc Galanter’s Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead article and theory); JUSTICE AND
POWER IN SOCIOLEGAL STUDIES 1 (Bryant G. Garth & Austin Sarat eds., 1998) (“connect[ing] an
understanding of culture’s normative ideals with examination of the complex ways that law works in
the world”); SALLY ENGLE MERRY, GETTING JUSTICE AND GETTING EVEN: LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS
AMONG WORKING-CLASS AMERICANS (1990) (addressing use of court system to settle personal
disputes); TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (2006) (“[E]xplor[ing] the everyday behavior
of citizens toward the law and examin[ing] why people obey or disobey it.”); Robert J. Bies & Tom R.
Tyler, The “Litigation Mentality” in Organizations: A Test of Alternative Psychological Explanations,
4 ORG. SCI. 352, 352 (1993) (“identify[ing] different psychological factors that could explain why
employees consider suing their employers”); Lauren B. Edelman & Mark C. Suchman, When the
“Haves” Hold Court: Speculations on the Organizational Internalization of Law, 33 LAW & SOC’Y
REV. 941, 941 (1999) (“extend[ing] Galanter’s analysis by considering the ability of large bureaucratic
organizations to ‘internalize’ legal rules, structures, personnel, and activities”); Marc Galanter, Why the
“Haves” Come Out Ahead, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95 (1974) (addressing different interactions with
legal system between “one-shotters” and “repeat-players”); James L. Gibson, Institutional Legitimacy,
Procedural Justice, and Compliance with Supreme Court Decisions: A Question of Causality, 25 LAW
& SOC’Y REV. 631, 632 (1991) (arguing that “those who perceive the Court as more procedurally fair
are no more or no less likely to acquiese to unpopular Court decisions”).
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problematic deterioration of law, associated with loss of social control and
increased resort to non-legal means of redress, including violence, asocial
behavior and other potentially undesirable outcomes.23
This connection between citizenship and the rule of law on one hand
and beliefs about enforceability of contract on the other is discussed
specifically by several notable scholars. For instance, Eugen Ehrlich wrote
that the contract is the “juristic form for the distribution . . . of the goods
and personal abilities (services) that are in existence in society.”24 The law
embodies the norms of exchange in this “contract.” Actors interpret and
often reinterpret contracts they have created (or at least to which they have
consented). Actors’ interpretations of their contracts are colored by their
views of the law specifically, in context with respect to the relative power
of the parties, and generally, often drawing on notions of justice, equity
and fairness.25 Thus, a self-perpetuating loop that enables both economic
and social exchange to function is born. Max Weber and others after him
agree that contract creates law as much as law creates contract.26 This is
why, for example, the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) attempts to
embody and defer to industry custom (the norms of exchange), and why
those creating contracts governed by the UCC look to case law interpreting
it and related statutes in negotiating their instruments of exchange.
The proposition that our collective belief in the enforceability of
contracts is necessary for the law to remain self-sustaining is not novel.
On the contrary, the idea of the embeddedness of the state, and hence, the
law, in all seemingly private contracts is, in fact, rather old. Emile
Durkheim explained that there are no private contracts—even in
agreements between private parties where no explicit reference to the state
or the law is made:
It is true that obligations that are properly contractual can
be entered into or abrogated by the mere will to agreement of
the parties. Yet we must bear in mind that, if a contract has
binding force, it is society which confers that force. Let us
23
See generally DONALD BLACK, THE BEHAVIOR OF LAW (1976) (discussing law as one form of
social control); EUGEN EHRLICH, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW (1936)
(discussing relationship between legal decisions and society); Donald Black, Crime as Social Control,
48 AM. SOC. REV. 34, 34 (1983) (“examin[ing] . . . the so-called struggle between law and self-help”).
24
EHRLICH, supra note 23, at 48.
25
Tom R. Tyler, The Psychology of Legitimacy: A Relational Perspective on Voluntary Deference
to Authorities, 1 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. REV. 323, 336–38 (1997); see, e.g., James L. Gibson,
Understandings of Justice: Institutional Legitimacy, Procedural Justice, and Political Tolerance, 23
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 469, 474–90 (1989) (exploring connections between perceptions of procedural
fairness and conceptions of just decision making); Craig A. McEwen & Richard J. Maiman, In Search
of Legitimacy: Toward an Empirical Analysis, 8 LAW & POL’Y 257, 257 (1986) (“conclud[ing] that
institutional legitimacy is related to voluntary compliance”).
26
MAX WEBER, MAX WEBER ON LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 125 (Max Rheinstein ed.,
Edward Shils & Max Rheinstein trans., 1954).
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assume that it does not give its blessing to the obligations that
have been contracted; these then become pure promises
possessing only moral authority. Every contract therefore
assumes behind the parties who bind each other, society is
there, quite prepared to intervene and to enforce respect for
any undertakings entered into. Thus it only bestows this
obligatory force upon contracts that have a social value in
themselves, that is, those that are in conformity with the rules
of law. We shall even occasionally see that its intervention is
still more positive.
It is therefore present in every
relationship determined by restitutory law, even in ones that
appear the most completely private, and its presence,
although not felt, at least under normal conditions, is no less
essential.27
It follows from the above proposition that belief in the enforceability
of contracts is at least, in part, a reflection of belief in the state’s ability to
enforce law generally. Ehrlich agreed with Durkheim on this point and
took the concept one step further. Ehrlich believed not only that the law
and the state lurk in the shadows of all private contracts, but that informal,
everyday norms of social exchange do as well.28 He noted that even in
commercial dealings, contracts are not entered into as with definite
persons, “but as with the whole group of persons who are in a mutual
relation of exchange of goods with each other.”29 This idea that
contractual relations norms extend beyond the four corners of private
parties’ agreements to affect the scope of others’ legal power is echoed in
Weber’s writings as well:
In certain situations the normative control through
enabling rules necessarily extends beyond the task of the
mere delimitation of the range of the parties’ individual
spheres of freedom. As a general rule, the permitted legal
transactions include a power of the parties to the transaction
to affect even third parties. In some sense and to some
degree almost every legal transaction between two persons,
inasmuch as it modifies the mode of the distribution of
disposition over legally guaranteed powers of control, affects
relations with an indeterminately large body of outsiders.30
Taken together, the ideas of Ehrlich, Durkheim and Weber yield the
27
EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY 71 (W.D. Halls trans., The Free Press
1984) (emphasis added).
28
EHRLICH, supra note 23, at 45–48.
29
Id. at 46.
30
WEBER, supra note 26, at 126.
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feedback loop described above wherein law relies on norms of social
exchange, which in turn rely on law to sustain the social order generally.
Thus, the normative context of exchange, the social valences associated
with the provisions of agreements, and perceptions of law are all part of
this critical exchange relationship in which emergent contracts are the legal
representation of the interaction. This notion is encapsulated in Abram
Chayes’s influential work, The Modern Corporation and the Rule of Law,31
in social theoretical insights of how each person makes the law when he or
she writes a contract, and in the idea that the law is not about proscriptions,
but about individually crafted prescriptions.32 Because the way that parties
to a contract interpret their agreements has the capacity to affect the law,
the “disposition over legally guaranteed powers of control,”33 and a host of
other socially relevant measures, trust or faith in the enforceability of
contract is required for the feedback loop to be perpetuated.
The feedback loop—involving norms of exchange, interpretation of
law, law “on the books” and contract—begs the question of which element
is in control of the loop. Macaulay demonstrated that terms contained in
negotiated, arms-length business contracts among sophisticated and
knowledgeable actors are often eclipsed by the norms of interaction.34
These actors’ interpretations of how business is to be conducted dictated
how they behaved more so than the written terms in contracts they had
entered.35 Available contractual remedies were foregone, and extracontractual responses, including penalties for breach, were negotiated and
accepted in spite of pre-existing written agreements purporting to dictate
otherwise.36 These observations lead to the provocative Realist assertion
that “contract is dead.”37 However, this assertion, and the associated
scholarship, do not begin to fully explain the effects of this alleged death
on the contracting actors, and the conditions under which these important
norms and interpretations vary systematically. This research seeks to pick
up this very set of questions.

31
ABRAM CHAYES, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND THE RULE OF LAW 25, 32 (Edward S.
Mason ed., 1959).
32
See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN & STEWART MACAULAY, LAW AND THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES
577–78 (2d ed. 1977) (“[T]he source of law is said to lie in the will of the people. . . . [T]he structure of
the legal system itself—the way in which ‘custom’ or ‘public opinion’ is translated into ‘law’—is itself
an important factor . . . .”).
33
See supra text accompanying note 30.
34
Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations, supra note 9, at 59–62.
35
Id. at 60; see GILMORE, supra note 10, at 64–65, 70–71 (explaining that law of contract has
evolved to accommodate expectations of parties); see generally FRIEDMAN, supra note 11 (noting that
contract law changes along with society).
36
Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations, supra note 9, at 61–62.
37
GILMORE, supra note 10, at 1; Robert A. Hillman, The Crisis in Modern Contract Theory, 67
TEX. L. REV. 103, 113–15 (1988).
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A. Variation in Malleable Consent
Depending on one’s theoretical assumptions, it could be either
expected or quite counter-intuitive that actors vary in the way they
construe the enforceability of agreements into which they have entered. It
may be expected for those who posit that law is a differentiated resource.38
If form-adhesive agreements are interpreted and experienced in the same
way that other legal things are, it follows that variation exists here as it
does in contexts like the civil and criminal justice systems.39 Some could
view contract, regardless of its adhesiveness or form-ness, as a set of moral
obligations. In this instance, the morality of the agreement drives the
perceived enforceability and trumps other concerns like fairness,
instrumental cost-benefit calculations, or even legality. However, it is just
as easy to imagine how a different configuration of priorities could lead to
regarding the same form contract as unenforceable. Variation may
therefore also be expected for those who subscribe to the view of contract
as an embodiment of moral obligations, where one person’s morality may
differ greatly from her contractual counterpart’s.40 For some, a “deal’s a
deal” trumps “it’s not fair that I was forced to sign the waiver in order to
receive emergency medical treatment for my daughter.” Lastly, it may be
the case that variation in perceived enforceability is expected for those who
believe that resource-dependency dominates the decision-making process.
For instance, if one has to sign a contract in order to receive the benefit of
the bargain, one should be acutely aware of one’s true resourcedependence on the party requiring their signature. It would be rational and
expected to assume that a party who is able to force one to sign a contract
is also quite capable of enforcing its terms.
Variation in perceived enforceability is counter-intuitive for those who
assert that action is consistently, and almost uniformly, rationally selfinterested, as is often the case in economic models of behavior. In such
models, people sign because it is in their interests. They prefer to receive
38
See, e.g., EWICK & SILBEY, supra note 21, at 17; Kritzer & Silbey, supra note 22, at 8 (noting
that “repeat players . . . are much more likely to win [in court] than one-shot litigants”); PHILIPPE
NONET & PHILIP SELZNICK, LAW AND SOCIETY IN TRANSITION: TOWARD RESPONSIVE LAW 9 (1978)
(“[A] legal order has many dimensions . . . .”).
39
See, e.g., Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1617 (1986) (“Legal
interpretation, therefore, can never be ‘free;’ it can never be the function of an understanding of the text
or word alone.”); Kritzer & Silbey, supra note 22, at 4 (noting that one-shot litigants are disadvantaged
in other civil and criminal contexts); Sally Falk Moore, Law and Social Change: The Semi-Autonomous
Social Field as an Appropriate Subject of Study, 7 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 719, 719 (1973) (“The complex
‘law,’ thus condensed into one term, is abstracted from the social context in which it exists, and is
spoken of as if it were an entity capable of controlling that context.”); C. Wesley Younts & Charles W.
Mueller, Justice Processes: Specifying the Mediating Role of Perceptions of Distributive Justice, 66
AMER. SOC. REV. 125, 125 (2001) (“Justice is a rather murky concept in social psychology, perhaps
because of its various uses in common discourse.”).
40
See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 296–300
(1986) (articulating theories of contracts in which one’s morals inform one’s contractual obligations).
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the benefit of the bargain and incur the costs of signing the agreement,
because the benefits less the costs are assumedly preferred to incurring the
opportunity cost of foregoing the benefit of the bargain. In the
employment context, new hires are in a honeymoon period and could not
imagine having to sue their employers for being illegally fired or harassed.
They therefore view the costs of signing away their right to sue their new
employers in court as either extremely low or nonexistent. Why not give
away a right if the likelihood of needing it is so low? Down the road,
when signers want to do something the terms of the agreement prohibit,
actors are assumed to regard the contract as unenforceable, proportional
with their expected utility of seeking escape from the contract less the
perceived costs of seeking escape. This is most often the case in economic
analyses of behavior around contract.41
Similarly, those who study law with regard to norms of exchange often
laud the law as supporting shared, uniform and socially accepted
institutional rules as a reflection of public opinion.42 For instance, Jürgen
Habermas notes that the law allows actors to relate to each other as agents
predictably because of a shared understanding of legal obligation and
responsibility, thereby removing a heavy organizational burden from
communicative skills.43 Variability of subjective contractual enforceability
yields less predictability and increased social discord. This Article offers
evidence of this lack of uniformity, contending that actors vary in the
degree to which they regard the enforceability of terms, even when the
terms are constant and against their interests.
B. The Relationship Between Form-Adhesive Agreements and Malleable
Consent
Form-adhesive agreements are not new. In fact, writing in 1936,
Ehrlich observed that “[m]ost written contracts are drawn up according to
printed forms, the content of which often is not made known to the parties,
for it is determined by society quite independently of their individual
wills.”44 Form agreements were and continue to be justified byproducts of
41

See, e.g., Keith N. Hylton, Agreements to Waive or to Arbitrate Legal Claims: An Economic
Analysis, 8 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 209, 213–14 (2000) (explaining economic reasons for why parties
would choose to enter waiver agreements); see also Steven E. Plaut, Implicit Contracts in the Absence
of Enforcement, 76 AMER. ECON. REV. 257, 257–58 (1986) (explaining economics behind
enforceability of implicit contracts).
42
See W. FRIEDMANN, LAW IN A CHANGING SOCIETY 6, 10, 99 (1959) (“In a democracy, the
interplay between social opinion and the law-moulding activities of the State is a more obvious and
articulate one.”); JÜRGEN HABERMAS, 2 THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 365–66 (Thomas
McCarthy trans., 1987) (discussing social context in which laws are enacted).
43
See HABERMAS, supra note 42, at 365 (“This is true of cases where the law serves as a means
for organizing media-controlled subsystems that have, in any case, become autonomous in relation to
the normative contexts of action oriented by mutual understanding.”).
44
EHRLICH, supra note 23, at 49.
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a bureaucratic, industrialized society. Many judges and scholars initially
viewed such forms as innocuous conveniences—as the way to lubricate
economic exchange given the unavoidable impersonal nature of daily
interactions. As Weber noted, “forms are necessary only to the extent that
they are prescribed for reasons of expediency, especially for the sake of the
unambiguous demonstrability of rights, and thus of legal security.”45 He
believed, however, that the expanse of their use would be determined by
property rights and power. In fact, he theorized that the very tenet of
“contractual freedom,” and courts’ desire to avoid substantive analysis of
“fair deals,” would result in institutionally legitimated and routinized
power by the few over others.46
The nascent evolution of the notion of malleable consent is traceable
even in court opinions in which boilerplate was sought to be enforced. In
1960, the Supreme Court of New Jersey heard the case of Henningsen v.
Bloomfield Motors, Inc. in which a car buyer sued the automobile
manufacturer for consequential damages allegedly resulting from a
defective steering mechanism.47 The car maker argued that the buyer
waived his right to sue for such damages when he signed the contract
containing a waiver of damages clause in the fine print.48 The court ruled
that the waiver did not apply:
The traditional contract is the result of free bargaining of
parties who are brought together by the play of the market,
and who meet each other on a footing of approximate
economic equality. In such a society there is no danger that
freedom of contract will be a threat to the social order as a
whole. But in present-day commercial life the standardized
mass contract has appeared. It is used primarily by
enterprises with strong bargaining power and position.49
The court’s implied and uncanny prediction that the rise of the formadhesive agreement would upset the “social order as a whole” is
particularly emblematic of one of this Article’s propositions about the
scope and effect of this research. Specifically, this Article speculates that
the more we enter into form-adhesive agreements, the more our collective
notion of contract becomes watered-down. With the degradation of this
bedrock on which our economic system is based, this Article forecasts
major instability in industries predicated on boilerplate contracts, like the
45

WEBER, supra note 26, at 125.
See id. at 189 (“The result of contractual freedom, then, is in the first place the opening of the
opportunity to use, by the clever utilization of property ownership in the market, these resources
without legal restraints as a means for the achievement of power over others.”).
47
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69, 73, 75 (N.J. 1960).
48
Id. at 84.
49
Id. at 86.
46
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mortgage lending industry. Form mortgages are the norm, and because
people have numbed to contracts that appear similar and innocuous, this
Article speculates that many sign these agreements with greater malleable
consent than they should have for such contracts. A mortgage form may
look like the same form legalese as the “Terms & Conditions” that a cellphone service provider sends to its customers in the mail, but they are not.
Greater perceived unenforceability on a mass scale can have dire economic
consequences if and when the drafting organizations seek enforcement of
terms that individual signers regarded incorrectly as mere invitations to
negotiate just as individuals might with more innocuous form agreements
like the cell-phone service Terms & Conditions or other commonly
encountered forms. The greater the societal level of malleable consent, the
less trust there is in the rule of law. Less trust in the rule of law yields
increased resort to non-institutional, extra-legal forms of coercive power
and other negative outcomes.50
Lastly, it is worth noting two additional notions that may be applicable
when addressing individual behavior around form adhesive agreements.
The first comes from the literature on the phenomenon known as
“escalation of commitment.”51 Part of this research has demonstrated that
the less often or less actively actors participate in a negotiation process, the
less buy-in the actors feel to the terms of the agreement.52 It follows that
actors who do not participate at all in the process of creating an agreement
have no control over the terms or the process by which the parties bind
themselves (this is the definition of form-adhesive agreements). In most
cases, these actors have no personal connection with the party that created
the agreement, and are more likely not to accept the agreement as
compared to actors for whom such conditions do not exist. It is possible
then, that such micro-level experiences also yield greater collective belief
50
This logical progression is somewhat analogous to arguments about other pervasive social
phenomena in that it is easy to believe but hard to prove. For instance, it may be easy to believe that
pervasive depictions of violence in music, television, video games and on the Internet has some
deleterious impact on social action. This notion, however, is difficult to prove, in part because of the
extent to which the phenomenon exists.
51
See, e.g., Joel Brockner, The Escalation of Commitment to a Failing Course of Action: Toward
Theoretical Progress, 17 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 39, 39–42 (1992) (reviewing development of theory);
Barry M. Staw, The Escalation of Commitment to a Course of Action, 6 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 577, 577–
80 (1981) (“[M]any of the most injurious personal decisions and most glaring policy disasters can come
in the shape of sequential and escalating commitments.”).
52
See ROGER FISHER ET AL., GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN
27–28 (Bruce Patton ed., 1991) (“Give them a stake in the outcome by making sure they participate in
the process. If they are not involved in the process, they are hardly likely to approve the product.”);
RICHARD E. WALTON & ROBERT B. MCKERSIE, A BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF LABOR NEGOTIATIONS
149–50 (1965) (explaining the importance of alerting opposing party of your intentions before entering
negotiations); D. Ramona Bobocel & John P. Meyer, Escalating Commitment to a Failing Course of
Action: Separating the Roles of Choice and Justification, 79 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 360, 360–61 (1994)
(noting prior scholars’ confusion of personal responsibility and public justification in escalation of
commitment studies).
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that such agreements are unenforceable against them.
A second notion comes from an observation frequently noted in the
legal scholarship on boilerplate. People tend not to read the form-adhesive
agreements they sign. As many argue, this is rational behavior for a
number of reasons.53 If subjects do not read the terms at the time of
consent, they would have no opportunity to know (or care) whether the
provisions are enforceable against them. Later, when they learn that the
terms exist, they can either accept that the entity that coerced them to sign
is legally entitled to use the form-adhesive agreement to the coercing
entity’s advantage (it is enforceable), or they can believe that the law
protects them, the individual, from such unfair behavior (it is
unenforceable). Thus, the fact that actors tend not to read or care what it is
that they sign is likely to produce ex-post differentiation in the perception
of the agreements’ enforceability.
C. Malleable Consent and Law as Coercive Power
If law is a means of social control, as many argue it is,54 then formadhesive agreements offer an appealing and convenient way for institutions
that draw from the well of institutionalized (legal) power to exert greater
control. In this sense, malleable consent can be a useful measure of the
popular response to this institutionalized form of control.
Institutions rely on form-adhesive agreements to protect their rights
and interests often to the detriment, exclusion or waiver of individuals’
rights and interests (examples are waivers, penalty clauses, etc.). Such
contracts are a powerful and subtle form of social control through the
appearance of the law. Signing a form-adhesive agreement could mean
either that pre-existing individual rights and interests are canceled out or
waived (the right to a jury trial, for instance), or that future benefits are
promised to be given by the individual to the institution usually upon the
occurrence of a described event (i.e. in credit card user agreements,
agreeing to pay a penalty for late payments). Institutions too could be said
to vary in their malleable consent; they selectively enforce form-adhesive
agreements against individuals in much the same way that laws are made
53
See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 STAN. L.
REV. 211, 241–42 (1995) (referring to choice of many to avoid reading form agreements as being
product of “rational ignorance” and other related limits of cognition); Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note
7, at 446–47 (“For any single consumer, the costs of monitoring a business’s standard-form contract
outweigh the benefits.”).
54
See, e.g., BLACK, supra note 23, at 2 (asserting that “[l]aw is governmental social control”);
ROSCOE POUND, SOCIAL CONTROL THROUGH LAW 18–20 (1942) (asserting that “[t]he major agencies
of social control are morals, religion, and law” and that “[i]n the modern world, law has become the
paramount agency of social control”); Lon L. Fuller, Law as an Instrument of Social Control and Law
as a Facilitation of Human Interaction, 1975 BYU L. REV. 89, 92 (arguing that “the law of contracts is,
after all, an instrument of social control directed towards those who may be inclined to ignore their
contractual obligations”).
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and enforced against individuals. Numerous historical accounts exist of
powerful actors creating rules to selectively enforce them against the less
powerful.55 It should not be surprising then that this process is replicated
through form-adhesive agreements. That is, institutions create forms in the
first place to demonstrate uniform treatment, and then permit individuals to
escape from the oppressive waivers in a demonstration of institutional
leniency and good will.56
The footnoted references cited above in support of the proposition that
institutions create forms to demonstrate uniform treatment and
subsequently permit variable leniency are Thompson’s account of the
Black Acts and Jerome Hall’s account of the laws of property and theft.57
These may be read as accounts of institutional renditions of malleable
consent. Put another way, individuals replicate what institutions do when
contracts (which are embodiments of state-institutional coercive authority
and power) purport to bind them to action or inaction, in ways inconsistent
with their interests. The essential difference is not in the process, but in the
outcomes.
The frequently cited Carrier’s Case, discussed in Jerome Hall’s
important work on the history of theft, offers a perfect example of the
sequence by which powerful social actors (wealthy, property-rich elite)
exhibit the institutional equivalent of malleable consent. In 1473, before
specific laws of theft were established to protect property, influential
property-owners first tried to adjust existing laws to comport with their
interests as their needs and interests were not within the intention or
existing interpretations of established laws.58 In the Carrier’s Case,
55
See, e.g., JEROME HALL, THEFT, LAW AND SOCIETY 15–16 (2d ed. 1952) (noting that
“subserviency of the courts to the militant power of the nobility became a commonplace” during
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and that occasionally during this time “royal letters were sent to
justices or to sheriffs ordering them to show favor to a particular person”); EDWARD THOMPSON,
WHIGS AND HUNTERS: THE ORIGIN OF THE BLACK ACT 259–69 (1975) (describing ways through
which the law operated in eighteenth century England as “clearly an instrument of the de facto ruling
class” to reinforce its position in society through both harsh enforcement and occasional, deliberate
leniency); Black, supra note 23, at 37–41 (citing instances where criminal conduct was used selectively
to enforce morals or exact revenge for past wrongs); William J. Chambliss, A Sociological Analysis of
the Law of Vagrancy, 12 SOC. PROBS. 67, 69–70 (1964) (describing purpose of first vagrancy laws “to
force laborers (whether personally free or unfree) to accept employment at a lower wage in order to
insure the landowner an adequate supply of labor at the price he could afford to pay”).
56
See THOMPSON, supra note 55, at 265 (noting occasions when even “the Government itself
retired from the courts defeated” and that “[s]uch occasions served, paradoxically, to consolidate
power, to enhance its legitimacy, and to inhibit revolutionary movements”); Douglas Hay, Crime and
Justice in Eighteenth—and Nineteenth—Century England, 2 CRIME & JUST. 45, 48–54 (1980)
(detailing significant increase in capital offenses during late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries
and corresponding rise in public pardons and judicially urged acquittals); Mary E. Vogel, The Social
Origins of Plea Bargaining: Conflict and the Law in the Process of State Formation, 1830–1860, 33
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 161, 162–66, 168–69 (1999) (explaining advent of plea bargains in the American
court system and their basis in “time-honored tradition of episodic leniency–frequent but irregular
pardons and grants of clemency”).
57
HALL, supra note 55; THOMPSON supra note 55, at 260.
58
HALL, supra note 55, at 32–33.
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existing law suggested that goods not delivered as contracted were not
“stolen” because through the act of bailment, the carrier had established
temporary property rights over the goods.59 When these conventional
understandings of bailment, property and theft proved problematic in a
world of increasing commercial exchange, the merchants and their lawyers
strained to substantively interpret the law to comport, in this case, via the
idea of “breaking bulk,” or opening the bails.60 When that proved too
difficult because the rules were insufficiently flexible to suit their needs,
new laws—whose letter comported directly with the merchants’ and the
King's commercial interests, resulting in more harmonious accord for those
compelled to be in compliance with the law—were concocted.61 The
transformed laws were then more easily relied upon to induce social actors
to comply therewith, resulting in more security for the already more
powerful actors’ interests and wealth.62
Following the same pattern, when individuals are faced with contracts
that bind them in ways they do not wish to be bound, first, they may alter
their expectations of what the contracts contain, either electing to ignore
the agreements entirely, or to develop beliefs about their contents not based
on careful readings but on normative expectations. This is supported by
the data presented in this Article—only three out of thirty-seven subjects
knew that they signed an agreement binding them to resolve all
employment disputes by arbitration in lieu of adjudication.63 It is also
supported by existing scholarship on reactions to boilerplate.64 Following
this, actors may strain to interpret existing agreements in substantive ways
that differ from their apparent intention, arguing that the way others must
regard these things differs from what the contract terms (institutional actor
claims) purport to do. It is in this step that we may see actors’ expectations
about the norms of exchange more saliently predicting variation in
action—some expect that their credit card late fees will be waived if they
call and ask their lender to do so, while others do not expect that this would
happen, and pay the fine. The variation in malleable consent documented
in this Article supports the occurrence of this reaction.
The last step is perhaps the most interesting, for those on the receiving
end of form-adhesive agreements are axiomatically not the authoritative,
59

Id. at 4.
See id. at 4 (summarizing arguments submitted by merchants and their lawyers maintaining that
a felony had occurred).
61
Id. at 33.
62
Id.
63
All data and analysis underlying these assertions are on file with the author and are available
for inspection upon request.
64
See Eisenberg, supra note 53, at 240–44 (describing tendencies of modern consumers to
consciously and unconsciously avoid reading boilerplate agreements); Hillman & Rachlinski, supra
note 7, at 446–54 (reviewing various reasons why individuals often choose not to read standardized
agreements).
60
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powerful authors of the contracts empowered to alter the terms of the
agreements. So, how do less powerful social actors react to form-adhesive
agreements? What effect does exposure (for some, prolonged exposure) to
these agreements have on these individuals?
Individuals may respond in four non-mutually exclusive ways. First,
exposure to form-adhesive agreements may have no effect. That is, some
individuals may sign these agreements and not care whether their rights are
affected or how. They could tolerate or accept the invasiveness of the
agreements and remain otherwise loyal to the organization(s) making them
sign. Indeed, a portion of the participants observed appear to fall into this
category, at least in the short-run. Second, actors could express “voice”
about the agreements—complaining either to the organizations themselves,
or more likely, in public venues. No substantial evidence of “voice”
emerged in this study, but this does not mean that it is not a plausible or
viable response. In fact, evidence of voice in response to form-adhesive
agreements exists in other settings.65 Third, they could “exit”—that is,
refuse to sign the relevant forms, or find creative ways of opting out, by
actually refusing to sign, editing the document before signing, or otherwise
avoiding such exchanges. One could regard the existence of malleable
consent itself as evidence in support of this response. The act of mentally
excusing oneself from an otherwise binding contract (that one has
indisputably signed without duress or fraud) is a creative way to “exit”
from the reality of an unpleasant situation.
Lastly, actors could seek retribution specifically against the
organization that made them sign, or more generally, against the institution
requiring signatures on form-adhesive agreements, embodied, perhaps, by
large, well-known firms such as internet service providers and media
conglomerates. Examples of such exercises of coercive, punitive power
might include neglect of duties or other counterproductive work behavior if
directed at a specific organization, or more generally, increased disrespect
for institutions’ intellectual or material property rights. In the literature on
sociology of law and sociology of work, such a response is referred to as
“resistance.”66
65

See, e.g., SULLIVAN, supra note 4, at 8–10 (detailing efforts of AT&T customer, Darcy Ting, to
fight against the company’s attempt to include waivers of rights and arbitration agreements into service
contracts); Posting of Angela Canterbury to Watchdog Blog, http://citizen.typepad.
com/watchdog_blog/2007/07/protect-your-ri.html (Jul. 13, 2007, 11:38 EST) (explaining rights of
Comcast customers to opt out of an “unfair and stealthy” arbitration agreement); The Small Print
Project, http://smallprint.netzoo.net/reag/ (last visited Sept. 11, 2008) (encouraging awareness of formadhesive agreements and compelling individuals to create their own boilerplate and to sneak it into
correspondence with institutions that force such agreements upon individuals).
66
See generally JUSTICE AND POWER IN SOCIOLEGAL STUDIES, supra note 22 (discussing
resistance as a weapon against oppression); MERRY, supra note 22 (discussing plaintiffs’ use of
resistance within the court system); Ewick & Silbey, supra note 21 (discussing resistance in sociology
of law context); Damian Hodgson, Putting on a Professional Performance: Performativity, Subversion
and Project Management, 12 ORG. 51 (2005) (discussing resistance in sociology of work context).
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This Article does not offer evidence of the hypothesized general
retributional response. That is, no evidence is presented in support of the
theory that those who feel bound by terms of form-adhesive agreements (or
those who do not feel that circumnavigation of such terms is an option) are
more likely to take negative, reciprocal action against other organizations
by doing things like stealing from them or disrespecting their intellectual
property rights. However, in a second study conducted of malleable
consent in MBAs, preliminary evidence was uncovered in support of the
connection between views about enforceability of form-adhesive
agreements and respect for organizations’ intellectual property rights.
Specifically, MBA students67 who said they are “not bound by [terms in
form agreements they have signed] because [they] don’t have a choice in
signing” or who said they are “not bound by such terms because practically
speaking, it’s usually the case that one can negotiate his/her way out of
them” were significantly68 more likely to agree or strongly agree that
“acquiring music, movies or software (sold for a fee) without paying for
them is acceptable because [they] don’t feel obligated to the organizations
that sell these things.” Conversely, MBAs who said that they are always
bound by form-adhesive agreements or that they are bound by such terms
because “practically speaking, an individual is not as powerful as an
institution,” were significantly69 more likely to disagree or strongly
disagree with that statement.70
Similarly, this Article presents no direct evidence of specific
retributional action taken against the entity promulgating the formadhesive agreements. It is unclear whether the subjects who expressed the
view that the form agreements they signed were not enforceable against
them (high malleable consent) actually exercised coercive power against
their employer at a greater rate than those who expressed the view that the
form agreements were enforceable against them (low malleable consent).
However, the current study does present preliminary evidence of the
connection between malleable consent and what subjects reported they
would do. Specifically, actors who expressed the view that form-adhesive
agreements they signed were not enforceable against them (high malleable
consent) were more likely to express views consistent with the notion of
the employment relationship as “transactional”—that is, as merely a
market exchange, devoid of loyalty or commitment.
Therefore this Article first argues that studying interpretations of
enforceability of agreements as a construct in itself is worthwhile because
67

n = 132.
p = .002.
p = .04.
70
All data and analysis underlying these assertions are on file with the author and are available
for inspection upon request.
68
69
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such perceptions are useful to understanding a contextualized form of legal
consciousness, as well as trust in the state and other regulatory institutions.
The next part of this Article systematically examines the construct in an
applied context, first using malleable consent as an intervening variable to
reveal otherwise obfuscated interpretations of law across different socioeconomic groups, and second as an independent variable predicting
employees’ conception of their employment relationship as transactional or
relational.
III. HYPOTHESES
A. Malleable Consent and Differences Across Socio-Economic Status
As Richard Ely remarked, “[w]hen economic forces make possible
oppression and deprivation of liberty, oppression and deprivation of liberty
express themselves in contract.”71 The literature on law as a differentiated
resource posits that perceptions of law will be different across socioeconomic status groups such that higher SES actors will feel less
“oppressed” and “deprived of liberty” than lower SES actors. If this is the
case, interpretations of enforceability of form-adhesive agreements should
reflect this distinction, revealing how unlevel the playing field is,
regardless of its appearance to the contrary. Put differently, everyone has
to sign these forms, but higher SES actors likely feel less bound by them
than lower SES actors. This leads to the first hypothesis:
(H1) Higher SES actors (those with greater educational
attainment and more job alternatives with lower dependence
on their employers) are more likely to regard form-adhesive
agreements they have signed as unenforceable than lower
SES actors (those with lower educational attainment, fewer
job alternatives and hence greater dependence on their
employers).
In other words, higher SES actors should exhibit more malleable
consent and lower SES subjects should exhibit less malleable consent. If
supported, this hypothesis would strengthen the notion that different social
groups hold different views about law relative to their ability to
circumnavigate a contract purporting to bind them to terms contra their
interests. Previous research on legal consciousness has demonstrated that
those who regard law as more accessible—as a sword wieldable on their
behalf—are often better-educated, with higher paying jobs, and greater
71

Bruce E. Kaufman, John R. Commons and the Wisconsin School on Industrial Relations
Strategy and Policy, 57 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 3, 8 (2003) (quoting Richard Ely, President, Am.
Ass’n for Labor Legislation).
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72

socio-economic status generally. Such individuals are represented by the
MBA subjects in the second study reported in this Article. Those who
regard law as a shield, protecting organizations from the ineffective slings
and arrows wielded by individuals, are often less educated, with lower
paying jobs, and lower socio-economic status generally. This group is
represented by the employees in the first study reported below. If
malleable consent is a useful concept for understanding legal
consciousness (derivative of institutional-legal faith or fear), it should
reflect this dichotomy.
B. Transactional–Relational Scaled Responses to Conflict
The formal right of a worker to enter into any contract
whatsoever with any employer whatsoever does not in
practice represent for the employment seeker even the
slightest freedom in the determination of his own conditions
of work, and it does not guarantee him any influence on this
process.73
The next step is to explore the relationship between interpretations of
enforceability (malleable consent) and the way in which individuals
exchange with the organizations requiring them to sign these agreements.
This was accomplished by developing a transactional-relational scale based
on Ian Macneil’s influential work.74 Existing research shows important
differences between employees who view exchanges as relational and
those who view exchanges as transactional. Employees who view their
relationship as “transactional” tend to regard the employment exchange as
primarily one of specific monetizable exchanges (pay for attendance) over
a specific time period.75 Such a transactional perspective focuses on the
essential exchange of pay (high pay, merit pay and advancement, for
instance) for work, to the exclusion of other typically longer-term

72
See generally BLACK, supra note 23, at 1–10 (discussing variations in application of law across
social, economic, and educational settings); Roscoe Pound, Introduction to EHRLICH, supra note 23, at
xxxi–xxxvi (discussing trends of legal behavior at group level rather than individual level); Black,
supra note 23, at 34, 41–42 (noting that those of lower socio-economic status receive less legal
protection).
73
WEBER, supra note 26, at 188.
74
See generally Ian R. Macneil, Relational Contract: What We Do and Do Not Know, 1985 WIS.
L. REV. 483 (discussing effect of relational thinking on contract formation).
75
See Marcie A. Cavanaugh & Raymond A. Noe, Antecedents and Consequences of Relational
Components of the New Psychological Contract, 20 J. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 323, 323–26 (1999)
(noting that transactional contracts involve “specific, short-term, monetary obligations that require
limited involvement”); Denise M. Rousseau, New Hire Perceptions of Their Own and Their
Employer’s Obligations: A Study of Psychological Contracts, 11 J. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 389, 391
(1990) (noting that transactional contracts typically involve “the absence of long-term commitments”).
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elements. In contrast, those who view their employment as a “relational”
exchange have open-ended agreements to establish and maintain a
relationship involving non-monetizable elements like trust, loyalty, job
security, career development, and support with personal problems.77 In
“relationally-governed exchanges . . . enforcement of obligations, promises
and expectations occur[s] through . . . norms of flexibility, solidarity, and
information exchange.”78 This is not the case for transactionally-governed
exchanges.79
One way to observe whether employees view their employment
exchanges as transactional or relational is to observe their responses to
workplace conflicts of varying severity. Relational-view employees tend
to respond to conflicts at work with more loyalty, and less exit and
neglect.80 They are more likely to resort to “voice”81 and to afford their
employers the opportunity to restore order when problems arise, resorting
to internal organizational outlets such as human resources departments,
instead of external ones like lawyers or governmental agencies. On the
other hand, transactional-view employees are more likely to go outside of
the organization, either exiting more quickly in response to conflicts, or
resorting to external means of redress. Similarly, research has found that
psychological contract breach has a greater negative impact in terms of
decreased job satisfaction, role performance and organizational citizenship
behavior on relational-minded employees.82
76
See Sandra L. Robinson et al., Changing Obligations and the Psychological Contract: A
Longitudinal Study, 37 ACAD. MGMT. J. 137, 138–41 (1994) (discussing the effect of perceived
changes in employment obligations).
77
Id.; see also Denise M. Rousseau & Judi McLean Parks, The Contracts of Individuals and
Organizations, in RESEARCH IN ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 1, 1 (L.L. Cummings & Barry M. Staw
eds., 1993) (presenting transactional and relational exchanges as points along a contractual continuum);
Elizabeth Wolfe Morrison & Sandra L. Robinson, When Employees Feel Betrayed: A Model of How
Psychological Contract Violation Develops, 22 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 226, 227 (1997) (“[V]iolation
decreases employees’ trust toward their employers, satisfaction with their jobs and organizations,
perceived obligation to their organizations, and intentions to remain.”).
78
Laura Poppo & Todd Zenger, Do Formal Contracts and Relational Governance Function as
Substitutes or Complements?, 23 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 707, 710 (2002).
79
See Rousseau, supra note 75, at 391 (“[T]ransactional contracts involve acquisition of people
with specific skills to meet present needs . . . [in] the absence of long-term commitments.”).
80
See William H. Turnley & Daniel C. Feldman, The Impact of Psychological Contract
Violations on Exit, Voice, Loyalty, and Neglect, 52 HUM. REL. 895, 896–99, 902–03 (1999) (studying
managers in this context); Jacqueline A.M. Coyle-Shapiro, A Psychological Contract Perspective on
Organizational Citizenship Behavior, 23 J. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 927 (2002) (studying public
sector employees).
81
Dan Farrell, Exit, Voice, Loyalty, and Neglect as Responses to Job Satisfaction: A
Multidimensional Scaling Study, 26 ACAD. MGMT. J. 596, 597–98 (1983); see also ALBERT O.
HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE AND LOYALTY 30 (1970) (“To resort to voice . . . is for the customer or
member to make an attempt at changing the practices, policies, and outputs of the firm . . . .”).
82
Sandra L. Robinson, Trust and Breach of the Psychological Contract, 41 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 574,
576–80 (1996); Sandra L. Robinson & Denise M. Rousseau, Violating the Psychological Contract: Not
the Exception but the Norm, 15 J. ORG. BEHAV. 245, 245–49 (1994); William H. Turnley & Daniel C.
Feldman, Re-Examining the Effects of Psychological Contract Violations: Unmet Expectations and Job
Dissatisfaction as Mediators, 21 J. ORG. BEHAV. 25, 25–29 (2000).
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Table 1 depicts four types of common employment disputes and their
associated predicted transactional and relational views. The disputes range
from mild to severe forms of breach of psychological expectations—the
first one involves the breach of the obligation to provide a workplace free
of co-worker to co-worker disputes; the second, the breach of the
obligation to comply with internal company rules about fairness of
treatment; the third, a breach of the obligation of the organization to
comply with external legal constraints; and the fourth, a breach of the
obligation to provide fair treatment and to comply with external legal
constraints with the ultimate negative consequence of unilateral
termination of the employment relationship.
Table 1: Transactional-Relational Comparative Responses to Employment Conflicts

Type of Dispute

1 Non-Legal

Interpersonal
Dispute

2 Non-Legal Dispute

between Individual
& Organization

3 Legal Dispute

between Individual
& Organization
(ongoing
relationship)

4 Legal Dispute

between Individual
& Organization
(Unilateral
termination of
relationship)

Responses
Transactional
Relational
Confront co-worker (As
Report incident to
subject perceives this issue
manager
to be beyond the scope of
(exchange of
the employment transaction, workplace free of
he will not trust
harassment for
Management to remedy it)
policing the
workplace)
Do not show up for work
Show up to work
(An internal rule was
(exchange loyalty
broken, so subject owes the
for future fair
organization nothing)
treatment, or
security)
Pursue outside legal
Report the matter
assistance—to ensure that
internally—trust
the organization does not
the organization to
violate subject’s rights
correct the wrong
and restore the
status quo; do not
resort to outside
legal assistance
Pursue legal remedies
Give Company a
against organization
chance to correct
the wrong and
restore the
relationship

Previous literature has mostly, if not all, but ignored interpretations of
the law and, specifically, the written contracts employees have signed in
assessing how employees view this exchange relationship and in predicting
how transactionally or relationally they view their employment
relationships. In fact, at least one paper claimed that “formal stipulations
employers . . . contribute only slightly to general perceptions of contractual
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obligations.” This Article tests the relationship between interpretations
of enforceability of contract and the transactional-relational scaled view of
work. The concept of malleable consent in the employment context is a
function of how much perceived (not actual) flexibility there is in a binding
agreement one has signed that purportedly limits legal remedial power
against an employer. Subjects who view work transactionally are more
likely to care whether there is such flexibility, and are therefore more
likely to report the belief that such elasticity exists, because they are the
ones most likely to resort to non-relational responses described in Table 1.
Conversely, subjects who regard the employment relationship as more
relationally oriented are less likely to express concern about their ability to
escape a clause limiting their rights to sue their employers because (1)
relationally-minded employees prefer to exchange relationally instead of
litigiously, (2) they do not believe that the formal, written contract
dominates their employment exchange anyway, and (3) to the extent that
such subjects believe that the formal written contract controls their
employment relationship, they are more likely to trust their employers to
treat them fairly in the long run.
Thus, the second hypothesis emerges:
(H2) An inverse relationship exists between a relational
view of exchange and malleable consent.
This means that the more one regards his employment relationship as
“relational,” (and is thus willing to trade loyalty and commitment for a
promise of some future benefit such as fair treatment, job security, etc.),
the more likely one is to express the belief that the form-adhesive
agreement he signed as a condition of employment is enforceable against
him. Conversely, the more one regards his employment relationship as
“transactional,” the more likely one is to express the belief that the formadhesive agreement he signed is unenforceable against him. Put
differently, the current study presents preliminary evidence of the
connection between malleable consent and what subjects reported they
would do in these conflict scenarios. Specifically, actors who expressed
the view that the form-adhesive agreement they signed were not
enforceable against them (high malleable consent) were more likely to
express views consistent with the notion of the employment relationship as
“transactional”—that is, as merely a market exchange, devoid of loyalty or
commitment.
For instance, Subject 14, a forty-five-year-old African-American
woman who had been working for her current employer for over three
years, reported that the form-adhesive agreement she signed was “just a
83

Rousseau, supra note 75, at 397 (emphasis added).
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bunch of you-know . . . . ” She reported further that, “I think they’d try to
enforce it, but basically, the way things are now, you can get a good
lawyer, and they can get around anything.” This is an expression of high
malleable consent because it is her opinion that a contract into which she
entered admittedly free of duress or fraud is nonetheless unenforceable
against her. She expressed a correspondingly high transactional view of
work, demonstrated by the consistent theme in her predictions of how she
would respond to hypothetical workplace conflicts. For instance, she
would not trust management to resolve a hypothetical interpersonal dispute
between her and a co-worker, opting instead to handle the situation on her
own. She would not come in on her day off if requested to do so, saying,
“I would just be like, ‘I’m sorry, I already made plans.’” If she were
sexually harassed, she reported that she would tell management, “I guess
you’re going to fire me, and I guess I’m going to consult my lawyer,”
without affording the organization an opportunity to address the situation.
If she were wrongfully terminated, she would “find an attorney” without
hesitation. In sum, her responses to hypothetical conflicts at work
evidence a tendency to view her exchange with her employer as
transactional, not relational, and with a corresponding high degree of
malleable consent.
IV. RESEARCH METHODS
A. Study 1: “InnoTech” (Low Socio-Economic Status Sample)
The construct of malleable consent emerged from an inductive field
study of a sample of thirty-seven current employees (“sales associates”) of
a national electronics retailer (herein referred to as “InnoTech,” a
pseudonym) in twelve locations in Southern California. InnoTech was
selected for study because of its policy requiring its sales associates to sign
a mandatory arbitration agreement upon hire. The locations were
randomly chosen from a pool of thirty stores within a forty-mile
geographic proximity to one another. Informants were approached outside
the retail shops on their breaks, or before or after their shifts. Informants
were offered five-dollar gift cards for their participation in the study and
were informed that all information provided would be anonymous and
confidential. To protect participants’ anonymity, no personally identifying
information was gathered other than subjects’ voices that were recorded
upon receipt of consent. Data gathered also consisted of the author’s field
notes of observations and unrecorded conversations.
Informants were 84% men, with a mean age of 27 years84 and an

84

Standard deviation = 5.12 years.
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average organizational tenure of 21 months.
The median duration of
employment was 14 months. Subjects were 51% white, 19% black, 19%
Hispanic and 11% other. Based on observation of sales personnel in each
location, this sample closely approximated the population of sales
associates employed in the geographical region sampled.
Subjects were asked about their alternative job opportunities, work
experience, education, training on and off the job, what they signed when
they started their jobs, how fairly they thought their employer treated them
overall, and whether they considered their current employment situation a
“job” or a “career.” Only 19% (seven respondents) reported that this work
was a career.86 Fifty-four percent of the participants reported having
access to lawyers. The mean rating of InnoTech’s “overall fairness” of
treatment on a 5-point Likert scale was 3.7.87 Based on the researcher’s
observation of sales personnel in each location, this sample closely
approximated the population of sales associates employed in the
geographical region sampled. Table 2 is a correlation matrix of the salient
descriptive demographic attributes of the sample.
Table 2: Correlation Table of InnoTech Respondents’ Demographic Attributes

1. Female
2. Black
3. Hispanic
4. Other
5. Age
6. Tenure
7. Career1
8. Lawyer2
9. Fair3

1.♦

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

.162
.162
-.153
.397***
.010
-.025
.047
-.168

-.065
-.048
.165
-.057
-.233
-.115
-.596***

-.048
.070
.193
.120
.113
-.018

-.019
-.040
.276*
-.211
.029

.393***
.056
-.267
-.408***

.338**
-.148
-.205

.029
.137

8
.

0

Note: ***Significant at 1% level; **Significant at 5% level; *Significant at 10% level.
♦
Numbers across the row correspond with variables down the first column: 1.=Female, 2=Black,
etc.
1
This variable is an indicator variable coded “1” if subjects said that their current employment
was “career” as opposed to a “job.”
2
This variable is coded “1” if subjects reported knowing a lawyer, and “0” otherwise.
3
This variable is a 5-point Likert-style rating of the overall fairness of treatment.

According to the subjects, they are highly substitutable; their jobs
require little if any training. Several subjects complained about the high
rate of turn-over among associates. Additionally, InnoTech subjects
85
86

.04).

Standard deviation = 21 months.
Not surprisingly, this view correlates positively and significantly with job tenure (.338; p =

87
Standard deviation = .91. The correlation between reported fair treatment by the organization
and subjects being black is, somewhat shockingly, highly negative and highly significant (-.596; p =
.0001), as was the correlation between subjects’ age and fairness ratings (-.408; p = .001), indicating
that older and/or black workers reported significantly worse overall fair treatment.
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generally expressed the notion that their jobs are the “best they can get”
and that alternative work is not readily available. Almost all subjects
completed one or two years of college, having mostly attended local
community college and dropped out either to join the workforce or to have
children. Other subjects were still attending college at the time of the
interviews. For these reasons, this sample was considered to have
uniformly lower SES actors than the MBA sample discussed in greater
detail below.
Subjects were also asked about how they would respond to the four
vignettes described in Table 3, designed to correspond with the types of
disputes set forth in Table 1, in order to examine the relationship between
malleable consent and the transactional-relational view of the employment
exchange.
Table 3: Descriptions of Vignettes

1

Type of Dispute
Non-Legal Interpersonal
Dispute

Vignette Description
“A co-worker is bothering you to the point
that it interferes with your ability to do your
job.”
“You are told to come in to work on a day
that you already scheduled off and you have
plans to be with family or friends.”

2

Non-Legal Dispute between
Individual & Organization

3

Legal Dispute between
Individual & Organization
(ongoing relationship)

“Your direct supervisor tells you that if you
do not sleep with him or her that your
employment will be terminated.”

4

Legal Dispute between
Individual & Organization
(terminated relationship)

“Your employment is terminated because of
your gender, race, national origin or
religion.”

Subjects’ coded responses to the four vignettes formed the bases for a
scaled transactional-relational measure. The more subjects responded in
ways consistent with a relational view, the higher they scored on the scale.
The fewer relational points, the less relationally they were estimated to
view their work relationship. Subjects with zero points (who had exhibited
no relationally coded responses) were considered purely transactional. The
six coded variables used for the scale and their distribution across the two
studies are listed in Table 4.
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Table 4: Comparison of Relational Scale Components Across Studies

Variable Name

InnoTech

MBAs

Hyp1_manager_only
Hyp1_self_help (rev.
coded)
Hyp2_show_up
Hyp2_sub/alt
Hyp3_citizen
Hyp4_HR

60%
17.14%

3.51%
4.39%

Welch Diff of
Means Test
p < .001
p < .06

30.56%
8.33%
48.65%
39.39%

60.23%
25.69%
33.04%
11.93%

p < .05
p < .05
p < .10
p < .05

Figure 1 below depicts the distribution of transactional-relational
scores across the two studies. Polychoric principle component analysis
(PCA) and factor analysis each sufficiently confirms the internal validity of
the scale when the variables “Hyp1_self_help” and “Hyp2_sub/alt” are
excluded.88 Including these two variables renders the internal validation
methodologically problematic.89 However, the two variables are included
in the model because of their strong facial validity and the fact that the
results reported herein remain robust whether the two variables are
included or not.

88
Polychoric PCA of the 4-elements scale demonstrates ample support for scalar convergence on
a single element. The eigenvalue of the primary element is 1.85. The difference between this
eigenvalue and the next closest is 1.05. This result was replicated with factor analysis (principle
eigenvalue = .56, with difference between that and next closest as .62) for those uncomfortable with
PCA, although it is the author’s opinion that PCA is the more appropriate tool for this analysis.
89
This is because the two variables excluded from the full model (“Hyp1_self_help” and
“Hyp2_sub/alt”) are each mostly or entirely orthogonal to the included measures of responses to the
respective vignettes (“Hyp1_manager_only” from first vignette and “Hyp2_showup” from second).
For instance, 98% of subjects who said they would show up in response to the second vignette
(“Hyp2_showup” = 1) did not suggest that they would also try to find a substitute or alternative
(“Hyp2_sub/alt” = 0). This makes logical sense in the same way that it makes sense that those who
said that they would take matters into their own hands in response to the first vignette
(“Hyp1_self_help” = 1) did not say that they would exclusively report the matter to their manager
(“Hyp1_manager_only” = 0).
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Figure 1: Transactional-Relational Scale Scores (InnoTech: N=37; MBAs: N=114)
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6

<---Transactional----------------------------------------------------------------Relational---->

The first variable, “Hyp1_manager_only,” is coded 1 (and otherwise 0)
for subjects who responded to the first vignette (an interpersonal dispute
between co-workers) by saying that they would bring the matter to the
attention of their manager before or without addressing the offending coworker themselves. This action is consistent with the relational view
because it demonstrates a willingness to trust management with the
resolution of non-legal disputes without first attempting to resolve the
matter on one’s own. While the difference between subjects who
exclusively reported the issue to management and those who confronted
the offending subject first and then reported to management may not
appear significant, using this measure offers a more conservative and
clearer divide between subjects. In other words, those who exclusively
trusted management with this situation are incrementally more relational
than those who attempted to resolve the situation on their own first.
The second variable, “Hyp1_self_help,” is coded 1 (and otherwise 0) if
subjects responded to the first vignette by taking matters into their own
hands, often literally threatening to resolve the situation with violence or
other means of self-help. It could also be considered “revenge” as it is in
other research.90 This response is inconsistent with the relational view
because it demonstrates subjects’ belief that they cannot rely on the
organization to resolve an interpersonal dispute. This variable is reversecoded for the relational scale.
Similarly, subjects were considered more relational if they said that
they would show up to work in response to the second vignette (for
example, they are scheduled for a day off, they have plans with family or
90

Karl Aquino et al., How Employees Respond to Personal Offense: The Effects of Blame
Attribution, Victim Status, and Offender Status on Revenge and Reconciliation in the Workplace, 86 J.
APPLIED PSYCH. 52, 52 (2001).
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friends, but they are asked to come in anyway). The third variable,
“Hyp2_showup,” is coded 1 (and otherwise 0) for subjects who said that
they would show up to work on a day they had scheduled off but were
required to come in anyway. This is perhaps the clearest and most
traditional measure of a relational exchange view of work while the
employment relationship is intact. Specifically, these subjects are more
likely to view the exchange as ongoing and one in which loyalty is traded
for security (or other measures).
The fourth variable, “Hyp2_sub/alt,” is coded 1 (and otherwise 0) if
subjects responded to the second vignette by proposing that they secure a
substitute for the work or suggesting that they find an alternative way of
accomplishing the work.
Again, this measure is a fairly clear
demonstration of a relational view as opposed to a transactional view of
work because it indicates subjects’ desire to exchange the above-andbeyond task of finding a way to accomplish the organization’s goals in
exchange for some future hard-to-quantify measure like security.
The fifth variable composing the transactional-relational scale is
“Hyp3_citizen.” This variable is coded 1 (and otherwise 0) for subjects
who responded to the third vignette (they are sexually harassed by a
supervisor) by bringing the matter to the attention of Human Resources
without threatening to bring a lawsuit or contact an attorney. Again, this is
classic organizational citizenship behavior, and indicative of a relational
view of work.
The sixth and final variable included in the full scale is “Hyp4_HR,”
which is coded 1 (and otherwise 0) when subjects reported giving the
organization a second chance even after their employment was terminated
for unlawful reasons described in the fourth vignette (“your employment is
terminated because of your gender, race, national origin or religion”).
Subjects who sought to appeal their termination within the firm were coded
as incrementally more relational than those who did not.
1. What Subjects Thought They Signed
Toward the conclusion of each interview, subjects were shown a copy
of the actual mandatory arbitration agreement that InnoTech requires all
sales associates to sign and were asked to identify the document. Most
subjects positively identified the document as one that they had to sign on
their day of hire. The researcher then explained the clause in the
arbitration agreement to the subjects. Specifically, subjects were told that,
if signers of the agreement wished to go to court to sue the employer, this
agreement purportedly prevented them from doing so (either during the
employment relationship or after it ended), requiring them instead to resort
to arbitration to resolve any and all disputes, even ones like those
discussed earlier in the interview, including the third and fourth vignettes.
Subjects were asked if they were to try to bring a lawsuit against InnoTech,

2008]

THE DEVIL IN THE DETAILS

415

whether InnoTech could in fact compel them to divert their claims to
arbitration instead of court as the document purports. Responses to this
question formed the basis for the measure of subjects’ malleable consent.
Thirty-six of the thirty-seven subjects remembered signing something
when they started their jobs at InnoTech. Thirty-one of the thirty-six
(86%) articulated what they remembered signing.91 Sixty-nine percent
mentioned signing something innocuous like tax forms or generic
paperwork. For instance, Subject 2 reported, “. . . just a lot of documents,
you know, making sure that I'm telling the truth about who I am and my
person and everything. W-2 forms, that's about all I can remember.”
Subject 7 reported, “All the tax forms, I think it was just the tax forms,
yeah, they made you fill out a whole bunch of stuff, like name and address,
we watched a bunch of videos, like learning on the computers, we call it ‘elearning,’ that’s pretty much it.” Another typical response was Subject
28’s: “Just the general initial employment forms, like uh . . . oh boy, I don’t
even remember what they were specifically anymore.”
Forty-two percent mentioned having to sign to consent to invasive
terms like a drug test, a non-competition agreement or an “at-will”
employment policy. Examples of the second category are as follows:
“I skimmed through them . . . so . . . [Do you have any
recollection of what they said?] I know there's a sexual
harassment one . . . .” (Subj. 2).
“. . . drug test, and no competition clause, you know, you
can't work for any other [descriptive term deleted] company .
. . .” (Subj. 3).
“There was a non-competition agreement stating that I
would not work at the same time on any project that
[InnoTech] currently offers, there were a couple of other
agreements, mainly, the contract saying that I would work for
[InnoTech] and get paid, but the non-competition agreement
is the most important of the multiple restrictions. [Anything
else that you recall?] Basically, like what my duties would
be and stuff like that.” (Subj. 10).
“It’s like a contract between store and employee. We
have to do certain things, and we have our certain rights, but
they can fire us whenever.” (Subj. 16).
91
Tenure on the job had no statistically significant relation to the ability to recall or the
willingness to report what the subjects signed (p = .7142), although everyone who had been on the job
for less than seven months (n = 6) was able to describe something about what they signed. The least
time on the job of someone unable to recall what they signed was seven months. Six individuals with
the most tenure in the study (35, 36(x3), 48 and 120 months) were able to recall and describe what they
remembered signing when they were hired.
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“Employment, . . . what do you call it, you know, the
whole, they can fire you for whatever reason . . . the
employment sheet. [What’s your understanding of that?]
They can fire you for almost whatever reason, pretty much,
as long as they have a valid reason. [They get to fire you?
That’s what it says?] That’s pretty much what it is.” (Subj.
17).
“. . . a paper that said that they're an open employer,
which means that they can fire you at any time for any
reason, that it was ok to drug test me.” (Subj. 21).
“A whole bunch of release papers basically saying that
[InnoTech] is not held liable for a whole bunch of stuff.
[Anything else?] Not to my knowledge.” (Subj. 33).
Only 17% reported signing either a mandatory arbitration agreement or
the waiver of the right to sue the employer. The following are examples of
responses in this last group:
“Tax papers, and arbitration in case of dispute with the
company, and later on they put in some security thing we had
to sign for, regarding the work environment and stuff like
that, and insurance papers, that came out later. [The second
thing you mentioned was an arbitration form, do you know
what that was?] Yeah, basically, it’s to protect [InnoTech] in
case we want to sue them in case anything happens.
Basically, what the arbitration form said was that in case we
had any dispute regarding labor issues or in case there was a
wrongful termination lawsuit or anything like that, we
wouldn’t go to court, we will have to resort to arbitration, and
arbitration only. [How do you feel about that?] I don’t think
it’s fair. [Why not?] I don’t think it’s fair because it’s
dragging. It’s not something you can go in and get out. It
doesn’t give you the options of—They’re protected
regardless, no matter what. Because if the two parties don’t
agree, you’re stuck in arbitration forever, so at some point
you have to settle—I think they get you over time, because
you’re going to get tired of going to arbitration. Because you
sign an agreement that says that you can’t go to court, that
you have to stay in arbitration. [So, why did you sign it if
you think it’s unfair?] Well, I needed a job. Most people do
need a job, half the people don’t know what it is, and when
you need a job, you say, ‘what’s the worst that could happen
here?’ You know? Worst scenario, I quit. So, you’re like,
‘ok.’” (Subj. 13).
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“[A] don't sue us kind of thing, where, you know, where
if, something happens here, and it's not, it wasn't through
workman's comp or anything like that, that I can't sue them or
anything like that. . . . If something happened to the point
where I either got hurt and I wanted to pursue it further than
workman's comp, that wouldn't be possible after I signed the
proper paperwork to not allow me to . . . and then also, if
something else happened, and [InnoTech] took care of it, but
I wanted to take it further, one, they would try to talk me out
of it, and two, they'd probably have me sign something that
says I couldn't do it anyways. [And that's OK with you?]
Well, nothing really happens, as long as you keep your nose
clean and don't screw with the girls, you'll be cool.” (Subj.
3).
“Basically things that I won’t sue them, that I’ll go within
the company, legal issues, nothing life threatening, nothing
that you wouldn’t sign at any other job, nothing that doesn’t
protect the company. [What do you mean by, ‘protect the
company?’] Basically saying, that like, for example, if you
have issues with a manager or something, you’re not going to
a lawyer and sue the company, you’re going to go within it;
there’s a word, I can’t remember the word now, that you
basically do all legal issues within the company, that, and of
course, the ‘U word’ is more or less illegal. [What’s the U
word?] The union. [Did you sign something that said that
you couldn’t join a union?] No, but, . . . no . . . but . . .
there’s nothing there that says that you can join a union, you
know. . . .” (Subj. 18).
It may be worth noting the forms that InnoTech actually gives to new
hires. It is my understanding based on information available to the public
that in addition to the mandatory arbitration agreement, InnoTech gives all
new hires an I-9 list of acceptable documents (to confirm an employee’s
identity), a W-4 form, a Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) form notifying
employees that the company may run a background check on them, and a
form notifying employees of InnoTech’s drug testing policy (employees
are required to consent on demand). Employees are also required to
acknowledge with their signature receipt of InnoTech’s policy forbidding
illegal forms of harassment, including but not limited to sexual harassment.
These policies have been in place long enough to cover all respondents in
this study with the possible exception of Subject 23, who has been with the
company for ten years.
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2. Subjects’ Malleability of Consent
Participants were asked to identify the arbitration agreement that,
according to the organization, all employees are required to sign.92 Sixtyseven percent of subjects positively identified the document. This
percentage is interesting considering the low number of participants who
knew they had signed an agreement waiving their right to a jury trial,
requiring them instead to resolve all disputes by final and binding
arbitration. Thus, most subjects recognized the form they signed when
shown the actual piece of paper, but did not know to what it was they had
agreed. Consistent with the Legal Realist scholarship exploring the
relationship between law as experienced and law as written, this makes the
participants’ interpretations of this document an even more salient
predictor of future behavior than the document’s terms themselves.
Participants were then asked to reflect on whether InnoTech could stop
them from bringing a lawsuit and require them instead to bring such claims
to arbitration as the document purports. Their responses were varied, but
for the most part, subjects either expressed the belief that they would be
“stuck” with the agreement if they signed it, or that the agreement was
unenforceable even though they signed it. Their responses formed the
basis of the subjects’ malleable consent. Thirty-one percent of the subjects
expressed the view that the agreement was unenforceable against them,
even if they signed away the right to bring a lawsuit against the company
in court. Their explanations were predominated by the notion that the law
protects individuals against institutions such as InnoTech.
They
recognized that InnoTech could require them to sign whatever it desired at
the outset of their employment, but that the law, embodied by the
employment-plaintiff’s bar, in their view championed for individuals’
rights, and would therefore permit circumnavigation of bothersome
contract provisions. The views of those who formed this group in the
InnoTech sample echoed sentiments expressed in Patricia Ewick and Susan
S. Silbey’s classic study, The Common Place of Law, in which they
characterized responses as perceiving law as a commodity in which being
able to “get” a lawyer or “afford” a good lawyer “exerted a profound effect
92
After being asked if they recognized InnoTech’s arbitration agreement, three provisions of the
agreement were pointed out to them in the text of the document. First, the provision that specifies that
InnoTech and the signer agree to “settle any and all” disputes or controversies arising out of the
employment relationship by “final and binding arbitration before a neutral arbitrator;” with the
examples as specified in the form of claims covered, including ones like sexual harassment (vignette
three) and terminations because of race, religion or national origin (vignette four). Second, the
provision that states that the signer understands that if he does file a lawsuit, InnoTech “may use this
Agreement in support of its request to the court to dismiss the lawsuit and require me instead to use
arbitration.” Third, the provision that states that signers have three days from the date of signature to
notify InnoTech’s Human Resources Department that they have withdrawn their consent to the
agreement, but doing so will render them ineligible for employment with InnoTech.
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“I think it’s [the agreement] stupid. [Subject laughs.]
[Why?] Because nowadays, you can go around that and still
get a lawyer, and still go to trial. [So you think that the
arbitration agreement isn’t enforceable?] Yeah, I think it’s
just a bunch of you-know. [What makes you think that it’s
not enforceable?] Well, I think they’d try to enforce it, but
basically, the way things are now, you can get a good lawyer,
and they can get around anything.” (Subj. 14).
“Ultimately, you can sign anything you want, but you
pay enough for the right lawyer, and it doesn’t matter what
you’ve signed. [Meaning, you don’t think it’s an enforceable
agreement?] No. [Why not?] It’s . . . there’s always a
loophole, there’s always a way, and if you have the money
and the time, and you have a lawyer that’s greedy enough and
says, ‘I’ll get a cut of this,’ I guarantee you, there’s
somebody who is going to find a way to get you out of this
agreement.” (Subj. 19).
B. Study 2: MBA Students (High Socio-Economic Status Sample)
The second study consisted of 115 students from a prestigious East
Coast business school. Primarily second-year MBA students were asked to
complete a larger online survey as part of a class.94 Completing the survey
was a requirement in the class, so the response rate was approximately
100%. Subjects were 62% male; approximately 65% of the subjects were
native English-speakers, and 65% were also partially or fully U.S.
nationals. Sixty-one percent reported having direct access to a lawyer.
The mean self-reported score of knowledge and experience with American
law was 2.895 on a 7-point Likert scale where “0” is no knowledge or
experience and “7” is extensive knowledge or experience. The intercorrelations of the demographic variables are reported in Table 5.

93
EWICK & SILBEY, supra note 21, at 152–55. See generally Patricia Ewick & Susan S. Silbey,
Common Knowledge and Ideological Critique: The Significance of Knowing that the “Haves” Come
Out Ahead, 33 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 1025 (1999) (examining expectations and beliefs held by ordinary
Americans about the American legal system).
94
It is unfortunate that the MBAs were not surveyed on their first jobs—they were all current
students, on the job market and mostly negotiating with employers for their first post-MBA jobs, but
not currently employed. It is uncertain what would change in these data if the MBAs were on their first
jobs, but this limitation is recognized nonetheless.
95
Standard deviation = 1.2.
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Table 5: Correlation Table of MBAs’ Descriptive Variables

1. Female
2. Native1
3.
Nationality2
4. Lawyer3
5.Know law4

1.♦

2.

.180**
.124

.516***

.081
-.031

.061
.187**

3.

4.

.088
.111

.389***

Note: ***Significant at the 1% level, **Significant at the 5% level, *Significant at the 10% level.
♦
Numbers across the row correspond with variables down the first column: 1.=Female,
2=Native, etc.
¹The variable “native” is coded “1” if English was the reported native language and “0”
otherwise.
²This variable is coded “1” for those who listed the United States as their partial or full
nationality, and “0” otherwise.
³This variable is coded “1” for those who did report knowing a lawyer, and “0” otherwise.
4
This represents subjects’ self-reported assessment of their knowledge and experience with
American law based on a 7-point scale.

Most of these subjects were highly sought after by prestigious firms
and were considering multiple competing job offers. Without exception,
the MBA subjects have greater educational attainment than the InnoTech
subjects, making them less replaceable in their future jobs. The mean
starting salary of the class in which the majority of MBA subjects surveyed
was approximately $84,000 per year.96 Sixty-seven percent of the MBA
class of 2007 went into service industries, of which consulting (25.3%) and
investment banking (17.5%) composed the greatest shares.
Not
surprisingly, the most prestigious, high-status employers recruit these
students every year and the students who composed this sample were no
exception. For these reasons, this sample was considered uniformly higher
SES actors than the InnoTech sample.
As part of the online survey, the MBA students were asked to respond
to the same four vignettes as the InnoTech employees by writing their
responses in open-ended text boxes. They were also asked to rate their
agreement or disagreement with the following statement, on a 5-point
Likert-style scale:
If I sign a contract with my employer that indicates that
in return for being hired, I agree to waive my right to sue my
employer in court, and instead have to resort to a process
called “arbitration” to resolve any and all disputes that arise,
that contract is enforceable, and I would not be allowed to go
to court.
96
This figure is based on the MBA graduates from the class of 2007. Eighty-three percent of this
class obtained jobs in the United States. The mean starting salary of students who worked outside of
the United States was $81,800. These figures are based on information obtained by the author from the
school’s career services office.
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The results are displayed in Figure 2. Thirty percent of the MBA
subjects exhibited low malleable consent because they either agreed or
strongly agreed with the statement. Fifty-one percent exhibited high
malleable consent—that is, they either disagreed or strongly disagreed with
the statement.97 This distribution was replicated in a second study
involving 138 MBA students in which 35% exhibited low malleable
consent and 50% exhibited high malleable consent.98
Figure 2: Malleable Consent of the MBAs (n=114)
50
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probably true
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V. RESEARCH FINDINGS
A. Malleable Consent and Socio-Economic Status
Hypothesis 1 states that actors with greater educational attainment and
more job alternatives that posses relatively lower dependence on their
employers are more likely to regard the form-adhesive agreements they
sign as unenforceable when compared to actors with lower educational
attainment, fewer job alternatives, and greater dependence on their
97
Roughly nineteen percent selected option three, “Neutral or Unable to Decide.” These
participants were considered as exhibiting neither high nor low malleable consent.
98
It is also worth noting that the MBA data is used to evaluate the convergent, discriminant and
predictive validity of the construct of malleable consent. As part of the much larger survey that
subjects completed, many psychometric tests were administered measuring such things as emotional
intelligence (“EQ”), Machiavellianism, positive/negative affect, self-esteem, distributive self-interest
and the NEO-5 factor inventory.
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employers. In other words, InnoTech subjects are more likely to exhibit
lower malleable consent than the MBAs. To test this hypothesis, the mean
malleability of consent of the InnoTech subjects is compared with that of
the MBAs. Table 6, depicting the statistically different mean malleable
consent scores of the two samples, demonstrates support for this
hypothesis. It appears that the MBA subjects are more likely than the
InnoTech subjects to report that an agreement they signed purporting to
prevent them from suing their employers (resorting instead to arbitration)
is unenforceable. The mean MBA malleable consent score (MC) was .63
(SD = .485) as compared with .31 (SD = .467) for the InnoTech sample
(where MC of one is equal to the view that the agreement is unenforceable
and MC of zero is equal to the view that it is enforceable).
Table 6: Comparison of Malleable Consent Levels Across Samples

Malleable
Consent

InnoTech

MBAs

High
Low

31%
69%

51%
30%

N

36

92

Mean/std.
dev.

.305
(.467)

.630
(.485)

Welch Test
of Difference of
Means

p=.000

B. Malleable Consent and the Transactional Versus Relational View of
Work
The second hypothesis is that viewing the form agreement as
enforceable (low malleable consent) is associated with an increased
likelihood of viewing the employment relationship as relational.
Conversely, expressing the view that the agreement is unenforceable (high
malleable consent) is associated with an increased likelihood of viewing
the employment relationship as transactional. To test this hypothesis, a
proportional odds model for ordinal logistic regression was applied. This
appeared to be the most appropriately fitting model. The p value for the
Brant test of the proportionality assumption was .53 for the MBA sample
and .01 for the InnoTech sample. This means that the proportionality
assumption is valid for the MBAs but not necessarily so for the InnoTech
subjects. The most likely reason for this is the relatively small InnoTech
sample size.99 It is unlikely to be cause for concern given the construction
of the transactional-relational scale. Additionally, the results are robust
99
Rollin Brant, Assessing Proportionality in the Proportional Odds Model for Ordinal Logistic
Regression, 46 BIOMETRICS 1171, 1173–74 (1990).

2008]

THE DEVIL IN THE DETAILS

423

when ordinary least squares regression is applied.
Tables 7 and 8 present the ordinal logistic regression results of the role
of malleable consent in explaining subjects’ transactional-relational scale
scores for InnoTech and MBA subjects respectively.100 The results
demonstrate consistent support for the second hypothesis across both
samples. In both cases, high malleable consent corresponds negatively and
significantly with subjects’ relational view of employment. As an
example, holding other variables constant at their means, there is a 26.5%
probability that a white, male InnoTech participant of average sample age
(twenty-three) who expressed the belief that the agreement was
unenforceable would score a zero on the relational scale (scored as
“transactional”). This probability drops to 0.06% that the same individual
would score a six on the relational scale.101

100
The full 6-element scale is used in these analyses. The salient results remain significant when
the 4-element relational scale is used as well—dropping the two coded variables that were excluded
from the principle component analysis and factor analysis as discussed above.
101
Interestingly, being a minority employee at InnoTech corresponds negatively with viewing the
employment exchange relationally. It appears that minorities are more likely to view their employment
relationships as transactional. This was borne out in analyzing the qualitative responses of subjects.
Indeed, several of the minority subjects spoke “off the record,” insisting on shutting off the recorder,
about their belief that InnoTech discriminated against them based on their race. It is not surprising that
such conditions, or at least the perception of such conditions, stymies relational exchange. Also
unsurprisingly, employees who viewed their work as a career as opposed to a job were significantly
more likely to view the exchange relationally. The gender of subjects did not seem to have any
significant role in explaining transactional-relational scores of InnoTech subjects, but it was
significantly positively correlated with expression of a relational view for MBAs. Women in the
InnoTech sample were no more or less likely to view their employment as more relational, but women
in the MBA sample were significantly more likely than men to view the employment relationship as
more relational.
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Table 7: Ordinal Logistic Regression Results: The Role of Malleable Consent in Explaining
Transactional-Relational View of Work (InnoTech Subjects)
Change in Predicted Probabilitiesa
Indep.
Variables
Malleable
Consent
Female
Black
Hispanic
Other
Age
Career

Ordered
Logit
Est.b
1.730**
(.03)
-8.13
(.423)
-1.140
(.175)
-1.910*
(.056)
-1.780*
(.079)
.028
(.716)
2.560**
(.008)

Transactional
0

1

2

3

4

5

Relational
6

.26

.11

.14

-.33

-.20

-.13

-.02

.12

.06

.02

-.02

-.10

-.06

-.01

.17

.08

.01

-.25

-.14

-.08

-.12

.33

.09

-.05

-.44

-.21

-.11

-.16

.32

.09

-.06

-.04

-.19

-.10

-.01

-.08

-.05

-.05

.01

.09

.08

.01

-.19

-.13

-.22

-.02

.13

.34

.09

Note: sample size=36; chi squared (df=7)=17.28; pseudo r squared=.39
a
Change in the predicted probabilities of holding each scaled valence for an increase from the minimum
to the maximum value of each independent variable, while holding all other independent variables
constant at their means.
b
The top entries are ordered logit coefficients.
P values are in parenthesis.
***Significant at the 1%level; **Significant at the 5% level; *Significant at the 10% level
Table 8: Ordinal Logistic Regression Results: The Role of Malleable Consent in Explaining
Transactional-Relational View of Work (MBA Subjects)
Change in Predicted Probabilitiesa
Indep.
Variables

Ordered
Logit Est.b

Transactional
0

1

2

3

Relational
4

Malleable
Consent
Female

-1.023**
(.02)
1.490***
(.001)
.340
(.435)

.01

.12

.09

-.16

-.52

-.01

-.17

-.12

.22

.08

.00

-.04

-.02

.05

.01

Nationality

Note: sample size=91; chi squared (df=3)=19.00; pseudo r squared=.21
a
Change in the predicted probabilities of holding each scaled valence for an increase from the minimum
to the maximum value of each independent variable, while holding all other independent variables
constant at their means.
b
The top entries are ordered logit coefficients.
P values are in parenthesis.
***Significant at the 1%level; **Significant at the 5% level; *Significant at the 10% level

Figure 3 is a graphical representation of the two salient quantitative
results of this Article—it shows a comparison of the Lowess-smoothed
mean malleable consent scores for the MBAs and InnoTech subjects by
subjects’ transactional-relational scale scores. The hypothesized inverse
relationship is present in both samples (supporting the second hypothesis),
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and the malleable consent of the MBAs remains consistently higher than
the InnoTech subjects (supporting the first hypothesis).
Figure 3: Comparative Lowess Graphs of Mean Malleable Consent by Relational Scores Across
Samples

VI. IMPLICATIONS
Through their interpretations of contracts, actors instantiate their
relationships with the state; they do so, it appears, on the basis of their
socio-economic status, opportunities and constraints of employment, and
power and potential to redress wrongs. From the vantage of individual
signers, increased exposure to form-adhesive agreements is tantamount to
increased loss of control over contracting capacity, a classical institutional
symbol of capitalism and economic freedom.102 As Weber noted, “the
present day significance of contract is primarily the result of the high
degree to which our economic system is market-oriented.”103 This loss of
control over such an obvious icon of economic freedom begs the question
of whether greater exposure to form-adhesive agreements has lead to
increased social levels of malleable consent, and consequently, perhaps,
less resort to institutional (legal) means of redress when persons’
experiences suggest breach of contract (which are not read or
understood).104
Malleable consent may be one critical indicator of how individuals
102

See generally PIERS BEIRNE & RICHARD QUINNEY, MARXISM AND LAW (1982).
WEBER, supra note 26, at 105.
104
See Supra note 24.
103
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respond to this loss of control. Form-adhesive agreements may be a
necessary means of expedient dealing for modern times. But like other
modern “necessary” conveniences, they may nonetheless produce
significant negative externalities. Such phenomena need to be studied, not
only normatively or in terms of their legality, but from a sociological
vantage—seeking to understand their causes and effects and how these
vary by social class.
This Article presents very preliminary evidence to support the theory
that occupationally advantaged actors respond to these contracts differently
than the less advantaged, which, in turn, results in different conceptions of
self relative to employers and the state. By exploring these differences
across two distinguishable groups, malleable consent is shown to be a
useful construct for revealing otherwise unobserved differences between
the groups’ subjective construction of law and social status, and hence
citizenship. It therefore seems that understanding malleable consent and
related behaviors surrounding form-adhesive contracts may lead to further
clarification of otherwise obscured social stratification on important
features of citizenship—specifically, the ability to make claims against
others or the state and the ability to mediate one’s relationships through the
law.
These findings might have been otherwise obfuscated, or at least more
difficult to discern, without measuring malleable consent. Indeed, no
statistically significant differences were observed between InnoTech
employees and the MBAs in terms of the rates at which subjects reported
wanting to resort to law to redress the hypothetical wrongs—even in the
vignettes in which they imagined being sexually harassed and losing their
jobs because of illegal discrimination.105 Without a measure of malleable
consent, the two groups would have appeared to have equally considered
the law to be a viable option in their arsenal. Research has previously
demonstrated that power-disadvantaged actors are constrained from taking
action to redress injustices.106 In the employment context, malleable
consent could be thought of as a cost that the advantaged perceive as
avoidable more often than the disadvantaged.
This research also offers initial support for the theory that there is a
connection between interpretations of enforceability of form-adhesive
agreements and exchange relationships between the drafters and signers of
105
The numbers illustrated sixty-six percent for InnoTech and seventy-five percent for MBAs.
This finding is consistent with prior research. See, e.g., EWICK & SILBEY, supra note 21 (finding many
people claim that they will resort to law if they experience denial of rights, but simultaneously describe
how they cannot afford a lawyer to help secure their rights).
106
See generally Ewick & Silbey, supra note 93 (examining cognitive perceptions about law held
by subjects of authors’ study); Morris Zelditch, Jr. & Joan Butler Ford, Uncertainty, Potential Power,
and Nondecisions, 57 SOC. PSYCH. Q. 64 (1994) (finding that existence of a power structure prevents or
delays actors from seeking redress for inequitities).
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such contracts. Individuals who regard the form-adhesive agreements they
must sign as a condition of employment (in this case, a mandatory
arbitration agreement) as unenforceable (high malleable consent) are more
likely to view their jobs as an instrumental transaction—as simply a market
financial exchange, and hence less likely to give their employers the
opportunity to resolve disputes internally. When actors are more likely to
regard form-adhesive agreements as enforceable (low malleable consent)
they are more likely to interpret their employment as an exchange of
obligations as well as rewards, imbued with a substantive, moral
relationship, what industrial relations scholars often refer to as a “social
contract,”107 or a “relational exchange.” In other words, when actors view
form-adhesive agreements as unenforceable, there is less perceived trust in
the employment relationship, and hence in the employer’s ability to resolve
disputes as well. This is an important finding as it is an indication of the
class divide so often overlooked or ignored in recent descriptions of
American social life. The measure of trust in the employer’s capacity to
handle disputes and the link between this measure and citizenship therefore
seems worthy of future discussion and research.
Methodological limitations notwithstanding,108 these results appear to
hold across diverse populations. One potential implication of this specific
preliminary finding is the connection between the overwhelming loss of
control over contract, a symbol of a democratic, capitalistic free-market
economic ideal, and increased resort to non-legal forms of redress when
contracts are perceived to be breached.
At the beginning of this Article, a feedback loop was described in
which social constructions of law create contract, and contract in turn
creates socially construed forms of private law, backed by the state. There
is a fundamental discrepancy between this subjectively driven form of
contract and the traditional objective theory of contract. This fundamental
discrepancy becomes most apparent when examining form-adhesive
agreements in which “freedom of contract” is a function of great imbalance
of mutual dependency and “meeting of the minds” is fictional at best.
Courts have clearly struggled with this discrepancy in deciding when to
enforce boilerplate of varying adhesiveness and one-sidedness. Perhaps
malleable consent is evidence in support of the feedback loop, in which
individual interpretation of these unique and ubiquitous contracts trickles
up at the same time as the law on the books (demonstrated in part, by
107

See sources cited supra note 20.
There are clear limitations, particularly when comparing across the two studies. For instance,
the MBAs were asked to imagine that they had agreed to terms that the InnoTech employees had
actually signed. As mentioned earlier, and described in more detail in the section below, this Article
presents preliminary support for the hypotheses generated. In spite of its limitations, this Article hopes
to establish some preliminary comparisons in order to provoke discussion in these theoretically
important areas.
108
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courts’ and commentators’ strain to apply objective theory of contract to
form-adhesive contracts) trickles down.109
VII. LIMITATIONS
This work is intended as grounded theory based on the limited
evidence currently available. This Article is only a first step; the construct
of malleable consent was born from an inductive study about exchange and
conflict at the workplace. It offers preliminary evidence of the construct’s
existence and an argument for its inclusion in the panoply of ways we
study how law emerges. Moreover, it takes form and evolves in our
collective conscious, along with its potential variation across structural
constraints, social strata and individual level constructions. The hope is to
generate hypotheses and provoke further discussion, in part from some of
the questions raised but not answered herein. For instance, this Article
does not explain when actors form beliefs about enforceability or whether
these beliefs are mutable in the short term (for the instant transaction) or
the long term, such that they carry over from one transaction to another.
Other questions raised include: What effect does malleable consent
play in negotiations, particularly in repeated transaction relationships?;
does variation in malleable consent reveal differences in actions and
outcomes even when actors have not signed form-adhesive agreements?;
how does malleable consent affect litigant decision making, and how does
the construct affect judicial decision making and legislation? If the
feedback loop described at the outset of this Article is valid, and the law is
informed by norms of exchange and vice versa, laws and judicial decisions
should accord increased levels of malleability of consent. More research
examining the prevalence of this theorized phenomenon is warranted.
Four limitations of this Article exist. First, this Article offers only
proposed hypothetical relationships and offers evidence in support of
component parts of these relationships. Much remains to be seen as to
whether malleable consent carries with it the extent of negative
repercussions it is theorized to carry.
Second, it is unclear at what point interpretations of contract
enforceability are formed. This presents some difficulty for two reasons:
one, the responses to the vignettes are measured before malleable consent;
and two, it weakens the ability to draw comparisons across the InnoTech
and MBA groups. There are some obvious apples-to-oranges problems
comparing across the two groups, a clear limitation of this research. For
example, the MBAs are asked about a contract they imagine signing at a
109
This notion was suggested to the author in a conversation with Stewart Macaulay. Courts too,
could be said to have some malleableness in rulings on enforceability of form-adhesive agreements.
This Article begs the question of the extent to which individuals’ malleable consent jives with that of
the courts, and the extent to which courts influence individuals and vice-versa.
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future job, while the InnoTech subjects are asked about a contract they
have actually signed as a condition of their current employment.
Understanding when malleable consent is formed may help to account for
the socio-economic differences described in this Article. Future research
measuring the construct over time could lead to useful causal findings
indicating what experiences affect these interpretations and whether actors’
views of malleable consent are mutable—a measure of the malleability of
malleableness, if you will.
Third, this Article lacks a basis for determining the effect on actual
behavior of being “right” or “wrong” about the enforceability of the
agreement. As mentioned earlier, InnoTech fully enforces the agreement
in question, and agreements to arbitrate such as the one hypothesized in the
MBA survey are mostly enforceable legally; most of the time that
organizations implement such agreements, it is because they fully intend to
use them to reduce the costs of employment litigation. They are loath to
make exceptions for fear of setting an undesirable precedent. What
happens to the MBAs with high malleable consent who attempt to sue? Do
they behave differently than those with low malleable consent who assume
the worst about their employers? How so? How does this experience alter
their behavior with respect to form-adhesive agreements in the future, if at
all?
Fourth, and unexplored in this Article, but with potentially important
implications, is the effect of malleable consent on signing habits. That is,
what if malleable consent beliefs carry over from one contract area to
another, leading one to believe that form-adhesive agreements are not
binding when they are? For instance, if one learns to have high malleable
consent from interacting with credit card companies that routinely grant
leniency on late payments, over time this person will believe that all formadhesive agreements, like credit card “Terms of Agreement,” are really
unenforceable, and will become less concerned about signing forms, even
if they contain unfair terms. To continue the hypothetical, this person then
signs up with a private military company like Blackwater, which similarly
requires new hires to sign a form-adhesive agreement that purports to
release Blackwater and all of its agents, officers and shareholders from
“any liability whatsoever” even when death or injury is “caused in whole
or in part by the negligence” of the company,110 the signer thinks this form
is no different from an American Express contract, and signs without
worry over the enforcement of the draconian provisions that may lurk
within. Blackwater relies on this form-adhesive agreement to prevent the
huge number of injured and dead from suing them.111 Understanding how
110

Daphne Eviatar, Contract with America: Hard Terms for the Soldier of Fortune, HARPER’S
MAGAZINE, Oct. 2007, at 74–75.
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Id. at 74–76.
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malleable consent carries over across contexts, and otherwise affects
signing habits, may contribute to a decrease in the abuse of such forms, or
may inform policy in ways not explored before this research.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Apparently, the devil is in the details. And, it has been said that
“[t]here are no honorable bargains involving exchange of qualitative
merchandise like souls for quantitative merchandise like time and
money.”112 But what happens when we do not realize that we have traded
our souls away until it is too late? The hope of this line of research is to
illuminate one subtle, yet ubiquitous exchange and its effects. This Article
highlights the difference between law on the books (embodied by what the
forms purport to do) and law in action (how signers experience and
interpret the forms) and explores the gap between the two. The point,
however, is that this gap is a “space, not a vacuum.”113 It is not enough
that we recognize this space, but that we seek to understand what fills it,
and how what fills it in turn affects the law and our interpretations of
ourselves relative to others as actors bound by laws and normative
constraints. Through such work, we hope to gain a better understanding of
citizenship across socio-economic boundaries. As has been done in other
areas, this classic socio-legal approach may open doors to explain this
space to inform policy and future research.
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William S. Burroughs, Words of Advice for Young People, http://www.jjjwebdevelopment.
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